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War Powers Abrogation
Jeffrey M. Hirsch*
ABSTRACT
The United States’ peacetime security is based entirely on its all-volunteer
armed forces. These volunteers, split equally between full- and part-time servicemembers, risk not only their health and safety, but also their economic
stability when they are called away from home for training or active duty.
Servicemembers’ duties also interfere with the demands of employers, creditors, and government agencies—which can result in job losses, financial difficulties, and other costs. As a result, the federal government has long used its
constitutional war powers to enact legislation protecting servicemembers from
many of these hardships. These statutes provide employment leave and antidiscrimination protection, tax relief, and special procedural rights that lessen
the burden of military service to ensure that the United States has a sufficient
number of well-trained soldiers.
Despite these statutes’ importance to national security, their applicability
to state entities is in doubt. Using the Supreme Court’s fluctuating state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, many state employers have invoked sovereign
immunity to bar servicemembers’ private claims for monetary relief. More
often than not, courts have sided with the states and dismissed servicemembers’ federal claims for want of jurisdiction. However, these decisions
are based on erroneous interpretations of the Court’s doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Under current law, the federal government’s ability to subject states
to individual suits is analyzed from a historical perspective. The inquiry asks
whether the states, in ratifying the Constitution, believed that they retained immunity in a given area. Based on misinterpretations of Court doctrine and a
refusal to apply the required historical analysis, many courts have held that
states are immune from claims filed under federal war powers legislation.
This Article provides the first comprehensive historical analysis of the
constitutional balance of war powers between the federal and state governments. This analysis unequivocally shows that the Constitution was intended
to provide the federal government with virtually all war powers. Moreover, the
Constitution requires that the very limited war powers left to the states must be
entirely under the control of the federal government. As a result of this history,
the federal government has constitutional authority to subject states to suit
through “war powers abrogation.”

* Geneva Yeargan Rand Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina School of
Law. Thanks is owed to John Coyle, Andrew Hessick, Carissa Hessick, and participants at the
14th Annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law for their helpful input.
This Article benefitted greatly from the extraordinary research efforts of Kemper Patton.
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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts involving military matters are not new. In the United
States, great political and societal schisms formed during the Vietnam
War. More recently, the country has been sharply divided over the use
of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.1 But there
1 See BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORP., HOW THE CURRENT CONFLICTS ARE
SHAPING THE FUTURE OF SYRIA AND IRAQ 23–24 (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE163.html [https://perma.cc/NYF4-2F7V].
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is an underanalyzed fault line: divisions between the federal and state
governments. Although a central feature of the Constitution is the
centralization of war powers in the federal government, states have
attempted to interfere with that authority in the past and continue to
do so now. The extent to which this interference continues hinges in
many cases on an unexpected legal doctrine: state sovereign
immunity.
Some state conflicts with federal war powers implicate the federal
government’s ability to call state militias into federal service. Imagine
a governor objecting to the Iraq War or conflict in Syria and trying to
block state National Guard members from being called into federal
military service—acts that have occurred before.2 Other forms of interference are less extreme, at least in isolation, such as state interference with soldiers’ federal employment and residency rights.
The United States has long relied upon all-volunteer armed
forces for its peacetime defenses. To encourage participation in the
military, the federal government has enacted several pieces of legislation that grant servicemembers protections in employment, taxes, and
other matters. Despite these protections, the all-volunteer system can
make it difficult to ensure a sufficient number of servicemembers are
enlisted. In recent years, for instance, as the United States’ involvement in overseas conflicts has remained significant, the military’s ability to recruit and retain soldiers has been described as a “crisis.”3
Exacerbating this crisis is the fact that numerous servicemembers have
alleged that state employers and other officials have been violating
their federal rights. Whether due to hostility to military service or an
attempt to avoid the costs associated with these protections, state actors have refused to comply with federal law encouraging military service. These violations undermine the goal of these laws—to
strengthen the nation’s security—and harm the servicemembers involved. Many servicemembers have been unable to sue states for
monetary damages, even though the federal statutes, enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional war powers, explicitly permit them to
do so. The problem is judicial interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. A confusing jurisprudence, to
be sure, but one that this Article demonstrates should not allow states
See infra notes 393–94.
Todd South, Rising Costs, Dwindling Recruit Numbers, Increasing Demands May Bring
Back the Military Draft, MIL. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2019/11/19/rising-costs-dwindling-recruit-numbers-increasing-demands-may-bring-backthe-draft [https://perma.cc/VG9T-D4NS].
2
3
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to thwart federal war power efforts with claims of state sovereign
immunity.
Over the last several decades, scholarly commentary on state sovereign immunity has been quite robust, tracking a sharp spike in interest by the Supreme Court in the 1990s. But commentary on “war
powers abrogation”4—the federal government’s ability to subject individual states to suit—has been an exception.5 It is not entirely clear
why this is so, although the prevalence of lower-stakes claims that attract less litigation and an erroneous assumption that Supreme Court
precedent has already answered the question may be to blame.
Whatever the reason, the lack of attention to war powers abrogation is
belied by its importance. This issue not only goes to one of the most
fundamental aspects of the Constitution—responsibility for the nation’s security—but also determines whether states can undermine the
federal government’s ability to recruit and retain servicemembers
through sovereign immunity claims.6 And there are a lot of servicemembers. As of 2018, the United States had approximately 2.1
million soldiers, split almost evenly between active and non-active
duty.7 Perhaps for this reason, attention to war powers abrogation is
on the rise. The Court recently sought the Solicitor General’s view on
a certiorari petition raising the war powers abrogation question, which
may be a sign of interest from the Court.8 In addition, more war powers plaintiffs appear willing to challenge state immunity claims and
state courts may be taking these issues more seriously.9
State sovereign immunity is only implicated when federal law
provides individuals the right to sue nonconsenting states for monetary damages.10 A variety of war powers statutes arguably permit such
suits, even some that may not be obvious. For instance, in 1790, Con4 “Abrogation” is not the best technical term for this doctrine but will be used for simplicity. See infra Part II.
5 See Major Timothy M. Harner, The Soldier and the State: Whether the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity in USERRA Enforcement Actions Is a Valid Exercise of the Congressional War Powers, 195 MIL. L. REV. 91, 96–98 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Can Congress Use Its
War Powers to Protect Military Employees from State Sovereign Immunity?, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 999 (2004).
6 See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 999.
7 Among non-active duty soldiers, 443,857 were in the National Guard and 595,451 were
in the Reserves. Erin Duffin, U.S. Military Force Numbers, by Service Branch and Reserve Component 2018, STATISTA (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/232330/us-militaryforce-numbers-by-service-branch-and-reserve-component [https://perma.cc/JQH4-GTR5].
8 Clark v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 137 S. Ct. 2149 (2017) (mem.).
9 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Torres, 583 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. App. 2018).
10 See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permitting suit for injunctive relief
against nonconsenting state official).
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gress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act11 (often referred to as the
“Indian Nonintercourse Act”) pursuant to its powers under both the
Indian Commerce Clause and the War Powers Clauses.12 The current
Indian Nonintercourse Act limits the conveyance of American Indian
land, which can lead to lawsuits by individuals against states that gain
title to covered property.13 Some states, in turn, have invoked state
sovereign immunity in defense of these claims, which courts have usually accepted.14
Most war powers abrogation litigation arises under federal laws
granting various protections to servicemembers. One such statute is
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”)15 which, among other
things, guarantees that military personnel and their spouses who are
forced to leave a state for military service will retain their residency
for purposes of voting16 and state and local taxes.17 The SCRA also
prohibits the sale of servicemembers’ property for the collection of
non-income taxes or assessments without a court order, in addition to
a number of other similar protections.18
SCRA rights have been explicitly extended to state National
Guard members upon being called into federal service.19 Moreover,
the SCRA provides for private rights of action, including those seeking monetary damages against states.20 Despite the fact that Congress
enacted the SCRA “to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense,”21 the only reported decisions addressing state sover25 U.S.C. § 177.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562 (1832); Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 534 n.10 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting intent to avoid hostilities).
13 See, e.g., Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 283–84 (5th Cir. 2000).
14 The basis for these decisions is typically a lack of clear abrogation in the Indian
Nonintercourse Act, but some also rely on an abandoned “chronological analysis” or fail to
address war powers abrogation at all. See infra Section I.B; Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 199 F.3d at
288 (applying chronological analysis); N.J. Sand Hill Band of Lenape & Cherokee Indians v.
Corzine, No. 09-683(KSG), 2010 WL 2674565, at *8 n.15 (D.N.J. 2010) (addressing only the
Indian Commerce Clause).
15 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043.
16 Id. § 4025.
17 Id. § 4001.
18 Id. § 3992; see generally R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34575, THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT (SCRA): AN EXPLANATION (2014), https://www.justice.gov/
crt-military/file/797396/download [https://perma.cc/44JR-5M54].
19 Veteran’s Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-330, 116 Stat. 2820.
20 50 U.S.C. § 4042.
21 Id. § 3902; see Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943) (holding that the aim is to
“protect those who have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the
nation” from exposure to personal liability without procedural protections).
11
12
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eign immunity claims have allowed states to avoid their obligations
under the statute.22
The impact of war powers abrogation is most far-reaching under
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
of 1994 (“USERRA”).23 Congress enacted USERRA and its predecessors via its war powers24 to promote the nation’s security through
protections for the all-volunteer armed forces.25 USERRA’s primary
entitlement is the right of reemployment for employees who must
take leave for military service, e.g., for National Guard training or
active duty.26 This reemployment right is enhanced through various
measures, such as a one-year just cause period27 and entitlement to
promotions, raises, and benefits that would have occurred absent the
leave.28 In addition, USERRA prohibits employment discrimination
based on applicants’ and employees’ membership or service in the
military.29 USERRA’s remedies are typical of an employment statute,
with the possibility of equitable relief and, importantly for abrogation
22 Webb v. California, No. CV 17-8499-DMG (KSx), 2018 WL 6184776, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
2018) (seeking refund of state license fees and use taxes); Hofelich v. Hawaii, No. 11-00034 DAE
BMK, 2011 WL 2117013, at *9 (D. Haw. 2011) (seeking damages against state for loss of property); Hofelich v. Hawaii, No. 05-CV-1178 IEG (JMA), 2005 WL 8173306, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2005)
(same). In these cases, the plaintiffs represented themselves, which may explain the courts’ acceptance of states’ sovereign immunity claims without any meaningful discussion of war powers
abrogation.
23 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335; see generally Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable” Discrimination, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 135, 140–44 (2016) (describing USERRA’s national
security purpose); Harner, supra note 5, at 96–98; Hirsch, supra note 5, at 1013–16 (describing
USERRA’s history, coverage, and protections).
24

Bedrossian v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2005).

See 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (stating that the purpose is “to encourage noncareer service
in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and
employment which can result from such service”); id. § 4301(a)(2) (stating that reemployment
and antidiscrimination rights “minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing service
in the uniformed services”).
25

26 Id. § 4312(a). Moreover, Congress amended the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), to provide
new employment leave rights for military families. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 585, 122 Stat. 3, 128–32; see Marcy Karin, Time Off for
Military Families: An Emerging Case Study in a Time of War . . . and the Tipping Point for Future
Laws Supporting Work-Life Balance?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 46, 64 (2009). However, because the
Court upheld FMLA family leave abrogation as valid under the Fourteenth Amendment in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), this provision has not faced
state immunity claims.
27

See 38 U.S.C. § 4316(c).

28

See id. §§ 4311, 4314(a)(1)(A), 4316(b)(1), 4318.

29

See id. § 4311(c)(1).
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purposes, monetary relief which includes backpay, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.30
The importance of these remedies is reflected in Congress’ relatively quick attempt to save USERRA’s application to state employers. A 1996 Supreme Court decision that overturned precedent to
limit Congress’s ability to abrogate state immunity31 threatened
USERRA’s longstanding coverage of state employers.32 Because the
understanding at the time was that state sovereign immunity applied
only in federal court, Congress amended USERRA to provide for
state jurisdiction over claims against state employers.33 In another
twist, however, the Court held in 1999 that states could now claim
sovereign immunity in their own courts.34 The result is that USERRA
plaintiffs now arguably lack any venue to bring their claims—unless
Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity is deemed
constitutional.
The impact that state sovereign immunity claims have had on
USERRA is illustrated by Texas Department of Public Safety v.
Torres.35 Leroy Torres enlisted as a member of the U.S. Army
Reserves in 1989 and served as a Texas state trooper starting in 1998.36
In 2007, he was called into active duty and deployed to Iraq, where he
developed a lung condition.37 He received an honorable discharge in
2008 and, because of his service-related medical condition, Torres requested that his state employer allow him to return to a different position.38 The employer refused, offering instead a “temporary duty
offer” to his prior trooper position.39 Torres resigned and sued for
monetary damages, alleging that his employer’s refusal to accommodate him violated USERRA.40 The state employer moved to dismiss
Torres’s suit based on its sovereign immunity and a Texas trial court

30

See id. § 4323(d)–(e), (h).

31

See infra Section I.B.

32

See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4303(4)(A)(iii), 4323(b).

33

See infra note 111.

34

See infra Section I.C.

35

583 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App. 2018).

36

Id. at 223.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

R
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rejected the state’s immunity claim.41 In a split decision, the court of
appeals reversed and dismissed Torres’s suit.42
If state employers like Torres’s are permitted to assert sovereign
immunity, then many of this country’s 2.1 million servicemembers
may be unable to enforce their rights under federal war powers legislation.43 Yet this result is not inevitable. As this Article demonstrates,
the Constitution did not contemplate that states could use sovereign
immunity claims to defy Congress’s war powers legislation.
In Part I, this Article discusses the history of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, ending with the historical analysis now required
for novel abrogation questions. Next, in Part II, the Article engages in
a first-of-its kind, comprehensive, historical analysis of the Constitution’s balance of war powers between the federal government and the
states—a balance that is almost entirely tilted in favor of the federal
government, whose war powers actions were intended to be unfettered by state interference. Finally, in Part III, the Article addresses
arguments opposing war powers abrogation and demonstrates that
those arguments are unable to undermine the overwhelming historical
evidence that the federal government can use its war powers to subject nonconsenting states to suit.
I. A HISTORY

SUPREME COURT’S SHIFTING APPROACH
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

OF THE

TO

State sovereign immunity jurisprudence is famously opaque, with
commentators and jurists frequently twisting themselves in knots to
make sense of the doctrine. There are numerous theories attempting
to square the doctrine,44 but those will not be discussed here. Instead,
this Article accepts the Court’s holdings as a given, arguing that war
41 See Torres v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 2017-CCV-61016-1, 2017 WL 8226710, at
*1 (Tex. Cnty. Ct. Nov. 21, 2017), rev’d, 583 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
No. 20-603, 2021 WL 769686 (mem.).
42 Torres, 583 S.W.3d at 232. The author of this Article authored an amicus brief arguing
that the Texas Supreme Court should hear Torres’s appeal and reject the state’s immunity claim.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Jeffrey M. Hirsch in Support of Petitioner, Torres, 583 S.W.3d
221 (2019) (No. 19-0197), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427212 [https://perma.cc/S8B8-SAVD]. An
amicus brief has also been submitted on the author’s behalf supporting certiorari before the U.S.
Supreme Court. Brief of Professor Jeffrey M. Hirsch as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Torres, (No. 20-603), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-603/164648/
20201223142439508_20-603_Amicus%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4M4-D5UR].
43 Some states have waived immunity under USERRA. See infra Section III.D.
44 Justice Souter’s dissent in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), describes different interpretations of Eleventh Amendment immunity, including one that would
apply only in diversity suits against nonconsenting states. Id. at 109–15 (Souter, J., dissenting);
see infra note 94 and accompanying text; William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Misunderstood
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powers abrogation remains valid under current doctrine. That doctrine now requires a historical analysis to determine whether the Constitution intended to permit state sovereign immunity claims in a given
area—an analysis that strongly supports war powers abrogation.
A. State Sovereign Immunity: The First 200 Years
State immunity against unwelcome legal claims has been a major
issue throughout America’s history going back to the Revolutionary
War. The colonies’ wartime debts preoccupied the Framers as they
met in Philadelphia to construct the new constitution.45 But, as was
the case for many issues, there were sharp disagreements about the
contours of state sovereign immunity—disagreements that required
vague compromises for succeeding generations to flesh out. Later developments have been no less contentious and have often failed to
provide much-needed clarity.
The Constitution’s text is silent on the matter of state sovereign
immunity.46 Yet, this omission does not mean the Framers thought
states lacked such immunity or did not consider the issue. Instead,
contemporary debates focused on the scope of state sovereignty,
rather than the existence of state immunity.47 Following the Declaration of Independence, the colonies largely considered themselves independent sovereign nations that enjoyed total immunity from most
legal claims, absent their consent. This degree of independence, of
course, was one of the central problems of the Articles of Confederation period, during which the lack of strong national authority prevented the confederation from engaging in many necessary tasks,
most notably providing for national security.48
Only a few years after the Constitution’s ratification, the Supreme Court directly addressed states’ sovereign immunity. In its 1793
Chisholm v. Georgia49 decision, the Court faced one of the situations
that preoccupied the Framers at the Constitutional Convention50 when
a South Carolina citizen sued the state of Georgia for repayment of
Revolutionary War-era debts. Many states had amassed substantial
Eleventh Amendment, 169 UNIV. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466298 [https://perma.cc/ND3Y-W7RJ].
45 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979).
46 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 104–06 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47 See infra notes 329, 332.
48 See infra notes 259, 261.
49 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
50 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 105 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).

R
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debts during the war with few means to pay it off51 and, although there
were numerous debates at the Convention regarding these debts, it
would be many years until Alexander Hamilton’s plan for a new national bank and taxation power was implemented.52
The Court in Chisolm, over a lone dissent, held that Georgia
lacked sovereign immunity to bar the claim.53 The multiple opinions
stressed that the Constitution, particularly Article III, granted the federal courts power to hear claims brought by individuals against nonconsenting states.54 This holding meant that states could not use
sovereign immunity to block suits seeking monetary remedies, placing
the budgets of debt-laden states at risk.
By some accounts, the states’ reactions were swift and fierce.55
Later that same year, Congress passed, and the states ratified, the
Eleventh Amendment overturning Chisholm. The amendment states,
in full: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”56
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to the jurisdiction of federal courts over suits brought by individuals who are not
citizens of the same state. But the Court has expanded the scope of
the Amendment and state sovereign immunity far past this text.57
After Chisholm, litigation over state sovereign immunity largely
went dark. It was not until 1890 that the Court, in Hans v. Louisiana,58
finally provided a meaningful interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Hans involved a breach of contract claim brought by an individ51 See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 297, 322–23 (2005) (noting $25 million in
state debt and $54 million federal).
52 Id. at 355–57.
53 2 U.S. at 420.
54 Id. at 450–79.
55 Georgia’s House of Representatives passed a bill that would subject anyone who attempted to enforce Chisholm to hanging without the benefit of clergy. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 720–21 (1999). Others have questioned whether the reaction was as strong, noting that although Congress was in session when Chisholm was announced and a constitutional amendment
was introduced two days later, Congress did not immediately act upon the decision and it took
two years before the Eleventh Amendment was ratified. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 106 n.5
(Souter, J., dissenting). But see Alden, 527 U.S. at 721 (stating that Congress, by near-unanimous
vote, passed Eleventh Amendment within two months of Chisholm).
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
57 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (noting that Court has interpreted Eleventh Amendment more broadly than its text); infra Sections II.B, C.
58 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (seeking payment of coupons).
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ual against his own state.59 The Court, while acknowledging that the
text of the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to such suits, held that
the state could invoke sovereign immunity.60 According to the Court,
it would be “anomalous” and an “absurdity on its face” to think that
those ratifying the Eleventh Amendment would have prevented suits
against a state by citizens of another state or foreign country, but not
of the same state.61 The Court also pointed to Chief Justice John Marshall’s general comments about state immunity during the Virginia
Constitution ratification convention, although it failed to address the
fact that Marshall was discussing federal suits by citizens of a different
state.62 Importantly, the Court relied upon Alexander Hamilton’s The
Federalist No. 81, where he both extolled the virtues of state sovereign
immunity and noted by reference instances where it would not
apply.63
The period following Hans was another quiet one for state sovereign immunity, with the next notable case occurring eighty-six years
later. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,64 the Court addressed another aspect of
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence: whether Congress could abrogate states’ immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The employee in Fitzpatrick sued his state employer under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act,65 the preeminent federal employment discrimination
statute.66 Title VII explicitly permitted private rights of actions against
state employers for monetary damages, thereby raising state immunity
concerns.67 Yet, in an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court
held that Congress could abrogate states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.68 In addition to
noting its earlier approval of abrogation under the Interstate Commerce Clause,69 the Court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “substantive provisions are by express terms directed at the
States” and imposed duties upon them that Congress had the power to
59

Id. at 1.

60

Id. at 10–11.

61

Id. at 10, 15.

62

Id. at 14.

63

Id. at 12–13; see infra notes 329–32.

64

427 U.S. 445 (1976).

65

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.

66

Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448–49.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
69 Id. at 452 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184,
196 (1964)).
67
68

R
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enforce via appropriate legislation.70 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment was a “limitation[] of the power of the States and enlargement[]
of the power of Congress.”71 As a result of this “carv[ing] out” of state
power, states are unable to assert sovereign immunity in the face of
valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation.72
Subsequently, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,73 the Court
reasserted Congress’s ability to abrogate pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause in Article I.74 The plaintiff sued the state of Pennsylvania under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),75 seeking reimbursement
for funds it paid to remediate a Superfund site.76 Earlier decisions by
the Court and several circuit courts had all suggested or held that
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce included the ability
to abrogate.77 Borrowing from Fitzpatrick, the Court emphasized that
when the Constitution gives the federal government authority to act in
a certain area, states cannot interfere with the full exercise of that
power.78 The Interstate Commerce Clause did just that by giving Congress “plenary” power and taking it away from the states, which
showed that the states had “surrender[ed] . . . [their] immunity in the
plan of the [constitutional] convention.”79 For this reason, and because
the Eleventh Amendment limits only judicial—not legislative—authority, Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.80
70

Id. at 453 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5).

71

Id. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).

Id. at 455–56 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)); see also Nev. Dep’t
of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (FMLA family leave). However, the Court will strike
down abrogation attempts under the Fourteenth Amendment that are not “congruent and proportional” to a statute’s goals. Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 43 (2012) (citing City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)) (self-care provision of FMLA); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
72

73

491 U.S. 1 (1989).

74

Id. at 8–13; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

75

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.

76

Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5–6.

77

Id. at 14–15.

See id. at 16. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamentally shifted the balance of power between states and the federal government, holding
that the Constitution permitted abrogation prior to the Civil War Amendments. Id. at 16–17.
78

79
ERALIST

80

Id. at 16–17, 19 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1934); THE FEDNO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
Id. at 18–19.
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Although Hans’s broad reading of the Eleventh Amendment still
stood, Union Gas represented the nadir of states’ modern sovereign
immunity. Because Congress possesses wide powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause,81 its ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity was immense. But that power did not last long.
B. The Abandoned Chronological Analysis: Seminole Tribe and the
Dangerous Dictum
A mere seven years after Union Gas, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida82 and invalidated
commerce abrogation. This was a pivotal moment for the war powers.
After Union Gas, it seemed clear that Congress could use its war
powers to permit private suits against states, as those powers—like the
commerce powers—were part of Article I.83 That Article I association,
however, was subsequently responsible for casting doubt on war powers abrogation. Since Seminole Tribe, many courts have held (wrongly,
as explained later) that war powers abrogation was not valid simply
because the war powers are part of Article I.
The fixation on the placement of war powers is entirely the work
of the decision in Seminole Tribe, even though the Court later shifted
its analysis again. In Seminole Tribe, the Court addressed abrogation
of state sovereign immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,84
which Congress enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause.85 The
Court applied what is now a familiar analytical structure for the validity of congressional abrogation. First, it asked whether Congress “unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity . . . .”86 If
so, the Court then examines “whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to
a valid exercise of power.’”87
81

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012).

517 U.S. 44 (1996) (addressing abrogation under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act);
see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 1; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683 (1997).
82

83 See, e.g., Reopell v. Massachusetts, 936 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding
USERRA’s war powers abrogation); Jennings v. Ill. Off. of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir.
1979) (same).
84

18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–1168; 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721.

85

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474
U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
86

87

Id. (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68).
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In Seminole Tribe, the Court assumed that the Indian Gaming
Act clearly expressed an intent to abrogate,88 but held that Congress
lacked the power to do so.89 In reversing Union Gas, the Court held
that the Indian Commerce Clause, and the Interstate Commerce
Clause by implication, does not give Congress the power to abrogate.90 The Court acknowledged the obvious point that the Eleventh
Amendment’s text, read literally, did not provide states immunity
from suits like the one in Seminole Tribe, where a citizen sues their
own state.91 However, expanding upon Hans, the Court laid out a
broad defense of state sovereign immunity:92 a defense in which the
Eleventh Amendment oddly becomes the incredible shrinking constitutional provision.
According to the Court in Seminole Tribe, a central feature of
state sovereign immunity is that it is a “background” constitutional
principle.93 At the time, there were disparate arguments about the
source of state immunity, including the notion that the Eleventh
Amendment was merely a codification of common law immunity that
Congress could trump via legislation.94 The common law argument
would give Congress immense authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, as that authority would have been coterminous with all of
Congress’s powers. Thus, Seminole Tribe’s holding that state sovereign immunity is constitutional in nature meant that congressional
power to abrogate would be far more circumscribed.
The Court’s justification for overruling Union Gas came down to
a fundamental disagreement with the notion that when the Constitution gives Congress plenary power over an area, it also permits abrogation of state immunity.95 Yet, the Court’s holding in Seminole Tribe
did not mean that Congress can never abrogate state sovereign immunity. In particular, the Court reaffirmed Fitzpatrick and stressed that,
Id. at 56.
Id. at 72.
90 Id. at 72–73.
91 Id. at 54.
92 Id. at 68–70.
93 Id. at 72.
94 See id. at 82–83 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
259–90 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012) (arguing that sovereign immunity is a common law backdrop rule);
Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex
Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 507–08 (1997). But see William Baude, Sovereign Immunity
and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017) (arguing that sovereign immunity is common law backdrop rule protected from abrogation in most cases).
95 Jackson, supra note 94, at 507–08.
88
89

R
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unlike the Article I Commerce Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Section 196 expressly prohibits states from engaging in certain actions,
while Section 597 provides Congress the power to enforce that provision.98 Thus, “by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy,” the Fourteenth Amendment “had fundamentally altered the
balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution” and
permitted abrogation.99
As described below, the war powers also expand federal power at
the expense of state autonomy—indeed they appear to do so more
than any other constitutional area.100 But an additional rationale in
Seminole Tribe later muddled what should have been a noncontroversial understanding that the Constitution does not permit states to
thwart federal war powers legislation.
This problem arose from an altogether unnecessary attempt to
distinguish Commerce Clause abrogation through what I call the
“chronological analysis.”101 In distinguishing Fitzpatrick, the Court in
Seminole Tribe stated that it was significant that the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified after the Eleventh Amendment.102 The laterenacted Fourteenth Amendment allowed abrogation because it “intrude[d] upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment,”103 which
was the source of state sovereign immunity.104 Accordingly, “[e]ven
when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization [under Article I] of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States.”105 This mention of Article I generally, rather
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
97 Id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.”).
98 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
99 Id.
100 See infra Section II.A.
101 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65.
102 Id. at 65–66 (“Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the preexisting balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment.”); see also Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 644 (2000).
103 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
104 See id. at 67, 71. The Court noted that the “plan of the convention” contemplated states’
immunity from suit, but the Eleventh Amendment set forth the specific principles of that immunity. Id. at 68 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934)).
105 Id. at 72.
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than the Indian Commerce Clause power specifically at issue in the
case, has become entrenched in some courts, despite the fact that it
was dictum and later abandoned by the Court.106 Under this view, because Article I was enacted before the Eleventh Amendment, Seminole Tribe’s chronological analysis meant that Congress can never
abrogate pursuant to its Article I powers, even if it has exclusive authority over an area.107
In the period immediately following Seminole Tribe, courts
adopted this Article I dictum as a rule of law,108 establishing a general
understanding that no Article I powers would permit abrogation.109
This included some courts striking down war powers abrogation under
USERRA.110 Congress, recognizing the danger that Seminole Tribe
posed to state employees’ USERRA rights, amended the statute two
years later to clarify its intent to abrogate state immunity and to provide jurisdiction for such suits in state courts—which, at the time,
were considered to be outside the reach of the Eleventh Amendment.111 The USERRA amendment’s legislative history explained that
it was a reaction to some states’ successful use of sovereign immunity
to avoid complying with the statute, which “raise[d] serious questions
about the United States ability to provide for a strong national defense.”112 Yet, some states continued to successfully assert sovereign
immunity against USERRA claims,113 despite the fact that the “Article I dictum” is no longer valid. Like so many other state sovereign
immunity issues, the Court shifted to yet another analysis that left the
door open for some types of Article I abrogation.
C. The Current Historical Analysis: Alden v. Maine
Although Seminole Tribe expanded the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment, it was still widely accepted at the time that state soverSee infra note 108.
517 U.S. at 73 (stating that “Article I cannot be used to circumvent the [Eleventh
Amendment’s] constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction”).
108 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002); Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 78 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 636 (1999).
109 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16 (appearing to confirm that Seminole Tribe would
invalidate abrogation under Article I bankruptcy, antitrust, and copyright powers).
110 See, e.g., Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1998).
111 Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998 § 211, 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b).
112 H.R. REP. NO. 105-448, at 5 (1998); see, e.g., Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210
(6th Cir. 1996).
113 See infra note 143.
106

R

107

R
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eign immunity was limited to federal courts.114 Soon after Seminole
Tribe, however, the Supreme Court fully cleaved state sovereign immunity from the text of the Eleventh Amendment—not only extending immunity beyond the federal courts, but also moving away
from Seminole Tribe’s chronological analysis to one focused on constitutional history.
The seminal case Alden v. Maine115 ushered in a new abrogation
framework: the “historical analysis” doctrine.116 The employees in Alden sued their state employer in federal court for overtime violations
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”),117 which contained a clear waiver of state immunity.118 After the employees filed
their FLSA suit, the Court issued the Seminole Tribe decision, leading
the district court in Alden to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.119 The employees then refiled their case in state court, prompting
the question addressed by the Court in Alden: are states immune from
private suits for monetary damages in their own courts?120 Despite the
prior understanding that the Eleventh Amendment applied only to
federal courts, the Court held that sovereign immunity extended to
state courts as well.121 To justify allowing states to claim immunity in
their own courts, the Court stressed that state sovereign immunity
does not flow from the Eleventh Amendment, which speaks only to
federal jurisdiction.122 That Amendment instead merely confirms preexisting state immunity, which “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as altered by the
114

See, e.g., Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394.

115

527 U.S. 706 (1999).

116

Id. at 743.

117

29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.

118

Alden, 527 U.S. at 711–12 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(x), 216(b)).

119

Id.

120

Id.

Because this Article argues that war powers abrogation is valid under current law, it
does not delve into the many criticisms of Alden. See, e.g., id. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting); Joan
Meyler, A Matter of Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court’s Reformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe and Its
Progeny, 45 HOW. L.J. 77, 141–48 (2001); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895–1914 (1983); John E.
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413,
1425–30 (1975).
121

122 Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (“[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from,
nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
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plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”123 Alden, therefore replaced the chronological analysis with a historical one
that looks to the “plan of the Convention” or relevant Amendments.124 In particular, the Court presumes that states are immune
from private suits absent “‘compelling evidence’ that the states were
required to surrender [their immunity] to Congress pursuant to the
constitutional design.”125 Such evidence may be found in the “history,
practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution.”126
In Alden, the Court held that this historical analysis failed to
show that the Constitution allowed Congress to abrogate state immunity in state court. First, the Court rejected the argument that under
the Supremacy Clause,127 substantive federal law was sufficient to abrogate state immunity on its own. That position, according to the
Court, was inconsistent with Hans and states’ constitutional sovereignty.128 Similarly, Congress’s “specific Article I powers . . . by virtue
of the Necessary and Proper Clause or otherwise” did not give it the
general power to subject states to suit to enforce federal enumerated
powers.129
After dispensing with these arguments, the Court turned to its
central inquiry: “In determining whether there is ‘compelling evidence’ that this derogation of the States’ sovereignty is ‘inherent in
the constitutional compact,’ we continue our discussion of history,
practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution.”130 To answer this question, the Court turned to historical evidence regarding
state immunity in their own courts, such as the Founders’ silence on
the topic;131 arguments raised by opponents of the Constitution;132
proponents’ response to these objections;133 the background of
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment;134 the absence of language in
Id.
See id.
125 Id. at 731 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991)).
126 Id. at 741–54; see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)
(examining original understanding of Constitution and early congressional practice).
127 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
128 Alden, 527 U.S. at 732.
129 Id. (noting reversals of Parden and Union Gas).
130 Id. at 741 (citation omitted) (quoting Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 781).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 741–42 (noting objection to states being subject to suit in federal court, which
“would have made little sense” if states gave up their immunity “in all events”).
133 Id. at 742 (noting claim that states could not be sued in federal court without their
consent).
134 Id. (noting one Justice in the Chisholm majority distinguished immunity in state and
federal court).
123
124
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the Eleventh Amendment suggesting that states lack immunity in
their own courts;135 a rejected draft of the Eleventh Amendment that
would have limited its scope to instances in which state courts provided a remedy;136 contemporaneous congressional practice;137 the
theory and reasoning of prior Court decisions;138 and the structure of
the Constitution.139 Based on these historical inquiries, the Court
concluded:
In light of the historical record it is difficult to conceive that
the Constitution would have been adopted if it had been understood to strip the States of immunity from suit in their
own courts and cede to the Federal Government a power to
subject nonconsenting States to private suits in these fora.140
No matter what one thinks of the holding in Alden, its significance for war powers abrogation lies in its insistence on a historical
analysis. As is discussed below, the history of the Constitution makes
it very difficult—if not outright impossible—to believe that it would
have been ratified had it been understood to give states the ability to
thwart federal war powers with claims of sovereign immunity. Moreover, Alden’s historical analysis made clear that Seminole Tribe’s Article I dictum was no longer valid.141 It is the “history, practice,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution” that resolves abrogation questions, not whether a constitutional power was ratified before
or after the Eleventh Amendment.142
Despite Alden, Seminole Tribe’s Article I dictum lives on, serving
as the basis for several courts’ rejection of war powers abrogation
claims.143 These courts ignore the fact that Alden actually supports war
powers abrogation. The shift from the chronological to the historical
analysis means that congressional powers that predate the Eleventh
Id. at 742–43.
Id. at 743.
137 Id. at 743–45 (noting lack of federal statutes permitting private suits against states in
state or federal court).
138 Id. at 745–48.
139 Id. at 748–53 (noting treatment of states as sovereigns, federal government’s immunity
in federal court, importance of immunity to state solvency at the time of the Convention, threat
to states’ ability to govern, and separation of powers).
140 Id. at 743. But see id. at 764–808 (Souter, J., dissenting) (countering majority’s historical
analysis).
141 See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 1019–21.
142 Alden, 527 U.S. at 741–54.
143 See infra Part III; Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Indian Nonintercourse Act); Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (USERRA); Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806
So. 2d 358, 362–63 (Ala. 2001) (USERRA).
135
136

R
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Amendment may provide the authority to abrogate.144 Ultimately, this
possibility moved from mere theory to reality when the Court held
that an Article I power—bankruptcy—permits Congress to subject
nonconsenting states to suits by individuals. Thus, the question of
whether Congress can use its war powers to abrogate state immunity—or whether there is even immunity that needs to be abrogated—
is not answered by those powers’ location in Article I, but by whether
the plan of the Constitution was to provide states immunity in the face
of federal war powers actions.145 Given the importance that the Founders and ratifying states placed on the need to centralize responsibility
for the nation’s security within the federal government,146 there is perhaps no constitutional authority more incompatible with state immunity than the war powers.
D. The Post-Alden Historical Analysis: Disregarding the
Dangerous Dictum
Alden presented a conundrum for courts, at least superficially.
On the one hand, the Court had previously stated in dictum that Article I cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity. On the other, Alden
made clear that the proper analysis for abrogation required a historical examination of the Constitutional Convention, which in theory
permits some form of Article I abrogation. As might be expected,
lower courts tended to hew to the language of Supreme Court decisions, even if dictum.147 The Court itself, however, has increasingly
demonstrated that this Article I dictum cannot be taken literally.
Initial cracks in the Article I dictum came to light in various
Court decisions that began to describe the limitation only in terms of
Congress’s commerce powers.148 This linguistic nuance ultimately led
to a direct engagement with the scope of Article I abrogation as applied to the Bankruptcy Clause.
See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 1021.
See infra Section I.D; Althouse, supra note 102, at 644–45 n.62 (raising possibility that
Alden validates war powers abrogation); Lieutenant Colonel Conrad, USERRA Note: The 1998
USERRA Amendments, 1999 ARMY LAW. 52, 53 n.97 (1999) (suggesting that war power abrogation may be exception to Seminole Tribe); cf. Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and
“The Plan of the Convention,” 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 747–48 (2002) (arguing that Alden validates Article I treaty abrogation). But see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties and the Eleventh
Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 726 n.69 (2002) (suggesting that war powers abrogation is
unconstitutional).
146 See infra Section II.A.
147 See cases cited supra note 143.
148 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (“Congress may
not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I power over commerce.”).
144
145

R
R

R
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In the aftermath of Seminole Tribe, most appellate courts held
that the Bankruptcy Clause did not provide Congress the power to
abrogate state immunity.149 In 2002, however, the Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding in Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp.150 that
Congress validly abrogated state immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.151 Ignoring the chronological analysis and Article I dictum, the
court in Hood appropriately employed a historical analysis of the federal bankruptcy powers, holding that they provide the authority to abrogate.152 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hood, but avoided
the abrogation issue presented by holding that a bankruptcy court’s
discharge of student loan debt did not implicate state sovereign immunity.153 The primary reason for that avoidance was that the case involved bankruptcy in rem jurisdiction, which did not seriously
threaten state sovereignty.154 The Court, therefore, declined to address whether other bankruptcy proceedings, particularly those involving personal jurisdiction over the state, would be constitutional.155
Two years later, in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,156 the
Court answered this question.
Katz involved a suit brought by the trustee of a bankrupt business
estate against state higher education institutions; the trustee was attempting to set aside preferential payments made by the insolvent
debtor-business to those institutions.157 The institutions argued that
the court lacked jurisdiction because Congress’s clear abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Act was invalid.158
The Supreme Court disagreed, but technically not on the abrogation
149 See, e.g., Nelson v. La Crosse Cnty. Dist. Att’y (In re Nelson), 301 F.3d 820, 832–34 (7th
Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d
237, 242–43 (3d Cir. 1998); Fernandez v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241,
243–45 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138–39 (5th Cir. 1997); Creative Goldsmiths
of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (4th Cir.
1997).
150

319 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d and remanded, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).

151

Id. at 761–62.

152

Id. at 763–67.

541 U.S. at 447–54 (emphasizing that claimant sought only discharge of debt, over which
bankruptcy court had in rem jurisdiction, not monetary or affirmative relief from the state
creditor).
153

154

Id. at 454.

155

Id.

156

546 U.S. 356 (2006).

157

Id. at 360.

158

Id. at 361 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)).
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question. Instead, the Court held that under the plan of the Constitution the states never possessed immunity from bankruptcy claims.159
The manner in which the Court reached its holding in Katz reaffirmed Alden’s historical analysis. The Court did not ask whether
bankruptcy was an exception to Seminole Tribe’s Article I dictum.160
Instead, the Court expressly cited to the history, purpose, and practice
of the Bankruptcy Clause to hold that the Constitution acted as a subordination of state sovereign immunity.161 Accordingly, Katz officially
confirmed what Alden implied—that states may lack sovereign immunity against some Article I powers.162
In applying the historical analysis, the Court emphasized several
features of the Bankruptcy Clause indicating that the plan of the Convention was to limit state sovereign immunity. In addition to courts’
ability to issue orders as part of in rem proceedings,163 the Court
stressed the problems associated with states’ disparate treatment of
debtors;164 early congressional legislative action, including the first
Bankruptcy Act’s authorization of federal court habeas writs against
state officials;165 and Congress’s Article I authority to create “uniform” bankruptcy laws.166 As a result, even when bankruptcy courts
invoke in personam jurisdiction over nonconsenting states—such as
through habeas writs or ancillary enforcement orders of courts’ in rem
jurisdiction—“the States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to
assert [sovereign] immunity.”167 In other words, when it comes to federal bankruptcy actions, states lack any immunity that needs to be
abrogated.168
Id. at 362–63.
Katz explicitly disavowed Seminole Tribe’s dictum assuming it prohibited bankruptcy
abrogation. Id. at 363. Moreover, Justice Thomas’s dissent objected to the majority’s conflict
with the Article I dictum, which he considered “settled doctrine” and a “long-established principle[].” Id. at 379, 381–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 362–63 (majority opinion) (“The history of the Bankruptcy Clause . . . demonstrate[s] that it was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to
authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena.”); see also
id. at 379 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (analyzing “text, structure, or history of our Constitution”);
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
162 But see Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1003 (rejecting copyright abrogation and stating, in dicta,
that Katz does not require a “clause-by-clause approach” to abrogation under Article I).
163 Katz, 546 U.S. at 362, 369–70.
164 Id. at 363 (noting that some states imprisoned debtors whose debts had been discharged
by another state); id. at 365–69.
165 Id. at 363, 373–75.
166 Id. at 370.
167 Id. at 373.
168 See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002–03 (2020).
159
160
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As we shall see in the next Part, the “bankruptcy exceptionalism”169 that deprives states of sovereign immunity that needs to be
abrogated applies equally, if not more so, to the war powers. There
are differences between the two powers, of course, particularly that
“[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem,” which implicates
state sovereignty to a lesser degree than other forms of jurisdiction.170
However, as explained in more detail below,171 Katz was in no way
limited to in rem bankruptcy proceedings, as the Court expressly held
that bankruptcy abrogation was valid even in cases involving in personam jurisdiction.172
The Court recently reaffirmed the need to employ a historical
analysis to state sovereign immunity claims in a 2019 decision,
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt.173 The issue in Hyatt was
not congressional abrogation, but whether sovereign immunity bars
individual suits against nonconsenting states in another state’s
courts.174 In overruling its own precedent allowing such suits, the
Court firmly reiterated the need to use a historical analysis—while
also noting that under the plan of the Convention, the states lacked
war powers.175
The entirety of Hyatt’s discussion of state sovereign immunity was
an examination of the history of the Constitution.176 Over and again,
often while explicitly quoting Alden, the Court looked to sovereign
immunity in other states’ courts through a historical prism;177 the dissent also relied on history, albeit with a different interpretation.178
Thus, despite drawing different conclusions, all members of the Court
understood that its current jurisprudence requires an analysis of “con169

Id. at 1002.

170

Katz, 546 U.S. at 362.

171

See infra Section III.B.

See Katz, 546 U.S. at 361–62, 371–72 (“We granted certiorari to consider the question
left open by our opinion in Hood: whether Congress’ attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) is valid. As we shall explain, however, we are persuaded that the
enactment of that provision was not necessary to authorize the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction
over these preference avoidance proceedings.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). But see
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002 (describing, in dicta, that Katz represented “bankruptcy
exceptionalism”).
172

173

139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019).

174

Id. at 1490.

175

See infra note 419.

176

See Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1492–99.

177

See id.

178

See id. at 1503–04 (Breyer, J. dissenting).

R
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stitutional design” and the “plan of the Convention.”179 Moreover, the
Court not only cited to Hamilton’s oft-repeated discussion of state
sovereign immunity in The Federalist No. 81,180 it also emphasized the
several instances in which the states gave up their sovereign immunity
under the Constitution.181 In short, state sovereign immunity is to be
judged in “light of [the Constitution’s] history and structure . . . .”182
Given these developments, what is the current state of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence? Things have been fairly stable since
Katz, after which there are three relevant and undeniable principles
regarding Article I abrogation:
(1) Most Article I powers, such as those related to commerce, do not provide Congress the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.
(2) The ability of the states to claim sovereign immunity
against federal actions, including those taken pursuant to Article I, is determined by a historical analysis.
(3) States lack immunity against federal actions under Article I’s Bankruptcy Clause.
These principles establish the path for war powers abrogation, despite the War Powers Clauses being part of Article I. That path leads
to one question: whether a historical analysis shows that, in ratifying
the Constitution, the states gave up or never possessed sovereign immunity against federal war powers actions. A comprehensive examination of the text, history, practice, and precedent of the Constitution
demonstrates that, under the plan of the Convention, there is a “war
powers exceptionalism” that deprives the states of sovereign immunity in the war powers arena.
II. STATES LACK SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AGAINST FEDERAL WAR
POWERS ACTIONS
The constitutionality of war powers abrogation currently faces judicial uncertainty. There is technically a federal circuit split on the
constitutionality of USERRA’s war powers abrogation, with the First
179

See id. at 1503 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760

(2002)).
180 Id. at 1493 (majority opinion). Notably, the Court never acknowledges, when quoting
Hamilton, that he was discussing federal diversity jurisdiction over suits seeking payment of state
debts.
181 Id. at 1495 (noting Article III’s provision for a neutral federal forum for state disputes
and the federal government’s ability to sue states).
182 Id. at 1496 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723–24 (1999)).
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Circuit upholding abrogation183 and the Seventh Circuit rejecting it.184
But both of these cases are outdated, as they were issued after the
Supreme Court overturned its approach to Article I abrogation in
Seminole Tribe, but prior to the subsequent shifts in Alden and Katz.
Moreover, because USERRA now appears to exclude federal jurisdiction over claims against state employers, the federal courts have
largely sat on the sidelines. In their place are several state court decisions which, for a variety of reasons, have largely followed the Seventh Circuit’s approach.185 However, none of those cases engaged in
any serious analysis of whether war powers abrogation would be valid
pursuant to the Court’s current jurisprudence.
Under the current, historical analysis of Alden and Katz, courts
must turn to the “history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the
Constitution” to determine whether states possess sovereign immunity
in a given area.186 This history is intended to reveal whether states
believed that their ratification of the Constitution excepted their sovereign immunity in a relevant area. The lack of this immunity is typically referred to as “abrogation,” but this can be something of a
misnomer. For instance, in Katz, the Court emphasized that it was not
discussing Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity because
when it comes to bankruptcy, states lack any immunity for Congress
to abrogate.187 As we shall see, the constitutional war powers have an
ever-greater claim to being devoid of any state sovereign immunity.
Although this Article will use the term war powers abrogation as a
convenient shorthand, what it demonstrates is that the states understood that under the Constitution they lacked sovereign immunity
when it comes to issues of war and the nation’s defense.
A. History and Structure of the Constitution
The central focus of the historical analysis is the “plan of the Convention,” i.e., whether the states, when ratifying the Constitution,
thought that they would have the power to assert sovereign immunity
Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir. 1996).
Velasquez v. Frapwell (Velasquez I), 160 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1998). This decision was
vacated in relevant part after the court realized that USERRA was amended to provide for state
court jurisdiction over claims against state employers. Velasquez v. Frapwell (Velasquez II), 165
F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 1999); see Hirsch, supra note 5, at 1046–47 (discussing Velasquez I and II).
However, state courts have still relied upon the Velasquez I decision. See, e.g., Clark v. Va. Dep’t
of State Police, 793 S.E.2d 1, 6 n.6 (Va. 2016).
185 See infra Part III.
186 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
187 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).
183
184

R
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to avoid private lawsuits filed pursuant to federal war powers legislation. As the Court has noted, because of the relatively anemic state of
the law at the time, the idea of individual, federal question lawsuits
against states was not an issue during the Convention period.188 Thus,
the historical record serves primarily as an implicit or indirect reference to the states’ thoughts regarding their immunity against private
lawsuits brought against them under federal law.
This indirect record is extraordinarily robust when it comes to
war powers authority under the Constitution. Although lawsuits arising from federal war powers legislation were not contemplated at the
time, the division of war powers among the state and federal governments very much was. The constitutional history demonstrates that
there was no dispute that states were completely subservient to the
federal government when it came to war powers.189 Indeed, the only
real point of contention was whether states had any role to play at all
with regard to war powers, not whether states could trump federal war
powers actions.190 Both proponents and opponents of the Constitution
were crystal clear on this latter point: states lacked any power to
thwart, obstruct, or arrogate the federal government’s war power authority.191 In short, the constitutional history reveals that the federal
government’s power vis-à-vis the states is at its zenith with regard to
war powers.
This history points to two possible conclusions regarding war
powers abrogation. First, like the bankruptcy power, states never possessed immunity against federal war power actions. Second, even if
states did retain some war powers immunity, Congress could validly
use its war powers to abrogate it. The stronger interpretation of the
historical record is that states never possessed war powers immunity;
however, the record also supports the view that, even if the states retained a default immunity, the plan of the Convention did not anticipate that states could thwart federal war powers legislation that
explicitly abrogated this immunity.192 This is especially true for statutes like the SCRA and USERRA, which are an important part of the
country’s security.193
188

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69–70 (1996).

189

See infra Section II.A.

190

See infra notes 309, 319.

191

See infra Section II.A.4.a.

192

See infra Sections II.A.4.b–.B.

193

See infra Part III.
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Because of the lack of war powers-related individual lawsuits at
the time, the historical analysis focuses on states’ authority to exercise
war powers vis-à-vis the federal government.194 If the plan of the Convention suggests that states had the war powers capabilities of a sovereign—such as retained commerce powers—then the argument for war
powers abrogation is weakened. On the other hand, a lack of state war
powers authority suggests that states lack sovereign immunity in the
war powers arena. The case for war powers abrogation is made still
stronger by evidence that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution both takes away war powers from the states and gives them
to the federal government.
What follows is a thorough historical examination of the Confederation period, the Constitutional Convention, and the Ratification
period, which points to one conclusion—when it came to war powers,
states were not sovereigns. Instead, whatever war powers they may
have had initially were extremely limited, if they existed at all, and
completely under the control of the federal government.
1. Confederation War Powers
If there was one time period in which the states195 had the strongest claim to war powers authority, it would be the Confederation period. This was the time of the Revolutionary War, during which the
states—recently self-declared as independent from England—joined
together in a confederation. The name alone suggests a union of sovereigns. To a large extent, that is what they were. Indeed, much of the
support for the later Constitution was based on concerns that confederacies were weak and threatened the newly liberated nation.196 However, even during the Confederation period, there was at least one
major exception to this state of affairs: war powers.
The governing document of that period, the Articles of Confederacy, aptly demonstrate the federal government’s supremacy over war
powers, despite its weakness in most other areas. The Articles of Confederation made clear that the new federal Congress was the source of
war powers, which the states lacked except in very limited circumstances. Moreover, whatever war powers the states did possess were
controlled by the federal government. Article VI, in particular—foreshadowing the war powers subsequently enumerated in the ConstituSee supra notes 160, 168.
Although the colonies did not officially become states until the Constitution was ratified, this Article will refer to the “states” of this period and later for purposes of simplification.
196 See infra note 225.
194

R

195

R
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tion197—explicitly prohibited virtually all state war powers and placed
whatever exceptions existed almost entirely under the direct control
of the federal government:
• No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any
State, except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for
the defence of such State, or its trade; nor shall any body
of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except
such number only, as in the judgment of the United
States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite
to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such
State . . . .198
• No State shall engage in any war without the consent of
the United States in Congress assembled, unless such
State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by
some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay, till the
United States in Congress assembled can be consulted:
nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be
after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or
state and the subjects thereof, against which war has been
so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless
such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of
war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long
as the danger shall continue or until the United States in
Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.199
• All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be
incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and
allowed by the United States in Congress assembled . . .
shall be supplied by the several States, in proportion to
the value of all land within each State . . . .200
• The taxes for paying [these costs] shall be laid and levied
by the . . . several States within the time agreed upon by
the United States in Congress assembled.201
197

See supra notes 242–54.

198

ARTICLES

199

Id.
Id. art. VIII.
Id.

200
201

OF

CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. VI.

R
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• The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power . . . of establishing
rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or
water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by
land or naval forces in the service of the United States
shall be divided or appropriated . . . .202
• The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power . . . of granting letters
of marque and reprisal in times of peace . . . .203
• The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures . . . .204
• The United States in Congress assembled shall also have
the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing
all officers of the land forces, in the service of the United
States, excepting regimental officers—appointing all the
officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers
whatever in the service of the United States . . . .205
• The United States in Congress assembled shall also have
the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . making rules
for the government and regulation of the said land and
naval forces, and directing their operations.206
• The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth
article . . . .207
The sheer number of explicit grants of federal war powers and
equally clear prohibitions against state war powers speaks volumes.
States did possess a limited military role under the Articles of
Confederation. For instance, under Article VI, states were required to
“keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed
and accoutered” and to maintain a proper amount of arms and equipment.208 Additionally, under Article VII, states could appoint lowerranked officers when raising land forces for the national defense.209
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id. art. IX.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. VI.
Id. art. VII.
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Moreover, Article IX imposed a supermajority requirement for certain actions, requiring that at least nine states “assent” to a variety of
federal actions including engaging in war; granting letters of marque
and reprisal; setting the number of naval vessels and armed forces;
and appointing commanders in chief.210 However, the rest of Article
IX makes clear that state militias and military equipment were only to
be used for war under the federal government’s orders or in the event
of an imminent invasion. Indeed, Article IX’s statement that “[t]he
United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive
right and power of determining on peace and war” could not have
made this division more clear.211 Other than a few enumerated exceptions, in which states could act pursuant to an emergency or congressional permission, it is the federal government that had exclusive war
powers. For that reason, contemporary statements on war powers
pointed to Congress as the sole authority in that arena.212
Given the weakness of the federal government during the Confederation period,213 this subservience is remarkable, albeit not surprising. The country was barely surviving a war against the greatest
military power of the day and, although ultimately victorious, was
hobbled and in debt. There was a real and palpable fear that the new
country would not be a country for long.214 This military vulnerability
was the backdrop against which the Framers considered how to divide
war powers between the states and federal government.
2. Plan of the Constitutional Convention
Despite the enormity of its Revolutionary War victory, the country’s circumstances were far from rosy. Saddled with debt, fractured,
and left with a tired and depleted military apparatus, there was a general understanding that fundamental reforms were necessary.215 The
result was the Constitutional Convention. Although not everyone
thought the Convention would or should create a new governing document to replace the Articles of Confederation, that soon became the
Id. art. IX. This assent requirement was not included in the subsequent Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
212 See, e.g., 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 106 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) (statement, in 1782 letter
responding to Rhode Island’s objections to import duties, by committee of Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and Thomas Fitzsimmons that “[t]he conduct of the war is intrusted to
Congress”).
213 See infra notes 285–89.
214 See infra note 295.
215 See infra note 221.
210
211

R
R
R
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goal. Among the primary rationales for such a fundamental change
was the anemic state of the new nation’s defenses. Despite its victory
over England, the Continental Army and colonial militias were made
up almost entirely of farmers and other non-professional soldiers who
were anxious to get back to their lives, especially given that most of
them had not been paid what they were owed for their wartime service.216 Similarly, ill feelings remained over the disparity in wartime
financial contributions from various states.
During the Convention, the Framers sought to strengthen—not
weaken—the federal government’s already clear preeminence over
war powers during the Confederation period.217 This was not an incidental or overlooked aspect of the Constitution. To the contrary, the
risks involved with giving war powers to the states were among the
most discussed aspects of the Constitution, particularly during the
subsequent ratification debates, and there was no question that the
new document made the federal war powers paramount. Most participants in these debates approved of federal supremacy over the states
in this area, while a minority opposed the Constitution in no small
part because it deprived the states of such powers.218 There was no
disagreement among either proponents or opponents of the Constitution that it left the states with little to no independent war powers.
Even the earliest drafts of the Constitution laid bare the fact that
the federal government was to retain almost sole authority over war
powers and that to the extent that states retained any such powers,
they were completely subservient to the federal government. For instance, the August 6, 1787 draft included a version of what eventually
became the federal war powers.219 This early draft provided Congress
and the President with a wide range of war powers, but its subsequent
amendment is most telling. In addition to these far-reaching war powers, the Framers added language, ultimately ratified, that explicitly
constrained states’ war powers authority and gave Congress direct
control over those powers.220 These amendments intentionally addressed the well-understood inadequacies of the Confederation government’s war powers and its inability to sufficiently protect the new
country. Edmund Randolph—who objected to the Constitution’s final
CHERNOW, supra note 51, at 176–77.
See supra Section II.A.1.
218 See infra Sections II.A.2, II.A.4.
219 See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 226, 228.
220 See id. at 229, 254; infra notes 248, 252–53.

R

216
217
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R
R
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draft during the Convention, but ultimately urged Virginia’s ratification—noted that “[t]he bravery of our troops is degraded by the
weakness of our government . . . Originally, our Confederation was
founded on the weakness of each state to repel a foreign enemy; and
we have found that the powers granted to Congress are
insufficient.”221
A focal point in the Convention’s war powers debate was the alternate New Jersey Plan, which would have replaced the draft Constitution with a more federalist system that gave smaller states more
power. Many Framers derided the plan for proposing a weak confederacy of states that threatened the nation’s safety from foreign governments. For instance, after criticizing the Confederation government’s
weak war powers,222 Alexander Hamilton asserted that the national
executive must have the power to make war and have “sole direction
of all military operations.”223 James Madison similarly emphasized
that wayward states should not be able to engage in war powers, citing
as an example Georgia’s violation of the Articles of Confederation
through its unauthorized foreign and war powers actions.224 The key
Framers, and others, also noted the failures of both historic and contemporary confederations, which they attributed to the lack of strong,
national war powers authority.225 John Jay similarly warned that if the
Constitution’s centralized war powers were rejected, among the states
“would arise mutual restrictions and fears, mutual garrisons and
standing armies, and all those dreadful evils which for so many ages
plagued England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, while they continued
disunited, and were played off against each other.”226
1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDCONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 416 (noting also Congress’s prior inability to use Confederation troops to quell a Massachusetts rebellion).
222 Id. at 420 (“[I]t is evident [the Confederation] can raise no troops, nor equip vessels,
before war is actually declared. They cannot, therefore, take any preparatory measure before an
enemy is at your door. How unwise and inadequate their powers!”).
223 Id. at 423.
224 Id. at 424.
225 See id. at 419 (Hamilton stating that confederation governing bodies in Greece, Germany, and Switzerland had “their decrees [] disregarded,” were “weak and distracted,” and
could not “prevent the wars and confusions which the respective electors carry on against each
other[]”). Several others made similarly negative comparisons to these and other foreign confederations. See, e.g., id. at 424 (Madison); 2 id. at 422 (James Wilson); id. at 214 (Robert Livingston); id. at 187–88 (Oliver Ellsworth); 3 id. at 242–43 (George Nicholas); THE FEDERALIST NOS.
18–20 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison). But see 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra, at 224 (John Smith); 3
id. at 62 (Patrick Henry arguing that these foreign confederations were successful).
226 1 id. at 502.
221

ERAL

R
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These comments demonstrate that the plan of the Convention
was to make the states completely subordinate to the federal government when it came to the war powers. And that is exactly what the
Framers believed that they achieved in the final version of the Constitution. Rufus King stated that “[n]one of the states, individually or
collectively, but in Congress, have the rights of peace or war.”227 Likewise, James Wilson declared that “[t]he power of war, peace, alliances,
and trade, are declared to be vested in Congress,” with which Hamilton agreed.228 It seems impossible to read the Framers’ debates and
conclude that they would have thought that a state could rely on sovereign immunity, or anything else, to thwart congressional attempts to
maintain the armed forces or to engage in any other federal war powers actions.
To be sure, some Framers objected to subordinating states under
the federal war powers.229 But those objections were in the minority
and overruled during the Convention and states’ ratification.230 Luther
Martin, for example, lamented the rejection of one of his proposed
amendments that would have prevented state action against the federal government from being considered treason; instead, Martin
would have had a state’s levying of war against the federal government be “regulated by the laws of wars and of nations.”231 He acknowledged that his amendment failed because it was “too much
opposed to the great object of many of the leading members of the
Convention.”232 The conclusion was that the federal government’s expansive war powers were not merely slipped into the Constitution unnoticed. Rather, they were a central component of the plan of the
227 Id. at 426. King also argued that the Confederation-era states lacked sovereignty, which,
while in conflict with the Court’s modern state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, was not an
unusual view among the Framers. See, e.g., id. at 461 (James Madison asserting at Convention
that “[s]ome contend that states are sovereign, when in fact they are only political societies . . . .
The states never possessed the essential rights of sovereignty. These were always vested in
Congress.”).
228 Id. at 427.
229 See id. at 378–79 (Luther Martin noting his overruled objections to President serving as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appointing military, as well as civil, officials); id. at
425 (noting the vote to reject the New Jersey Plan, with seven states for the motion, three
against, and one state divided).
230 See, e.g., id. at 370–72, 378–79 (Martin objecting to federal control of state militias without the consent of states—including the ability to send militia from one state into another and
subjecting citizens to military law—and the rejection of his amendment to limit these powers).
231 Id. at 382–83 (Martin stating that states should retain “recourse to the sword” to fight
repressive federal government).
232 Id. at 383 (describing that object as “by all means to leave the states at the mercy of the
general government, since they could not succeed in their immediate and entire abolition”).
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Convention, heavily debated and discussed, with the resulting federal
war powers representing the reasoned view of the majority of
Framers.
3. Text and Structure of the Constitution
The final draft of the Constitution reflected the inadequacies of
its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, and the Convention debates. Thus, final war powers text shifted the balance of power even
more to the federal government,233 making it the supreme, and possibly exclusive, holder of the nation’s war powers.234 To the extent that
states had any role to play, it was an extremely limited one that was
explicitly subordinate to the federal government.
One of the key differences between the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution was closely tied to war powers: the federal government’s new power to levy an income tax.235 As was discussed extensively in the ratification debates, the Framers understood that an
income tax was essential to the federal government’s ability to ensure
the nation’s security.236 Without the authority to raise revenue via
taxes, the Framers feared that the federal war powers would be woefully insufficient—understandably so, given some states’ unwillingness
to contribute financially to the Revolutionary War effort.237
The Constitution’s text provides strong support for war powers
abrogation. Although the Court has stressed that the federal government’s exclusive power over an area is not enough, on its own, to abrogate state sovereign immunity,238 the federal war powers are far
more robust than other Article I powers, if not any other power in the
Constitution. Even superficially, the sheer number of enumerated federal war powers suggests their importance.239 More significantly, however, their substance reveals an explicit centralization of war powers
in the federal government, as well as prohibitions against state war
powers activity. In the limited instances in which states retain a role,
233 For instance, under the Articles of Confederation, states could issue letters of marque
during wartime, but were expressly prohibited from doing so by the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (explaining the change). Compare supra note 199, with infra note
251.
234 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (stating that the Constitution better effectuated the administration of war powers than the Articles of Confederation).
235 See CHERNOW, supra note 51, at 297.
236 See infra notes 261, 271.
237 See CHERNOW, supra note 51, at 321–23.
238 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
239 See, e.g., infra notes 242–48.
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their activity is exclusively under the control of the federal
government.
Take, for instance, the President’s war powers. Under Article II,
the President is “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States . . . .”240 Thus, the President is
not only in charge of the federal armed forces, but also of the state
armed forces when called into service. The President also has sole authority to call these state soldiers into service.241 Under Article II,
therefore, the states allowed the head of the federal executive branch
to take full control over their armed forces—a remarkable relinquishment of power that is not indicative of a sovereign.
Congress’s war powers are even more extensive than the President’s. Article I explicitly lists a wide range of war powers, giving
Congress alone the authority to:
• “provide for the common Defence;”242
• “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;”243
• “raise and support Armies;”244
• “provide and maintain a Navy;”245
• “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces;”246
• “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;”247 and
• “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to
the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .”248
This latter power is significant; although states have the power to
appoint military officers and authorize the training of militias, they
can do the latter only “according to the discipline prescribed by Con240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. cl. 11.
Id. cl. 12.
Id. cl. 13.
Id. cl. 14.
Id. cl. 15.
Id. cl. 16.
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gress.”249 This is merely one example of the federal subjugation of
state war powers.
The War Powers Clauses not only confer upon Congress the authority to engage in a wide range of war activities, but unlike other
Article I powers, also explicitly prohibit state action.250 Under Article
I, section 10:
• “[n]o State shall . . . grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal;”251
• “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace . . . ;”252
and
• “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”253
Moreover, Article IV makes clear that the federal government
has the ultimate duty to protect the nation and each of its states: “The
United States . . . shall protect each [state] against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”254
These provisions, with their strikingly expansive grant of power
to the federal government and express limitations on state power, provide a sharp contrast to much of the other Article I powers. As a result, the constitutional war powers substantiate abrogation of state
immunity as much as, or more than, both the Bankruptcy Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment. Like with bankruptcy, the Constitution
stresses the need for highly centralized war powers, with little to no
role for the states. In addition, the War Powers Clauses share a critical
commonality with the Fourteenth Amendment: both give the federal
government express power to enact legislation that subjugates state
Id.
See John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70
UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1999) (“What the Constitution gives to the [federal] political
branches, it explicitly takes from the states.”); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70
UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1999) (arguing that constitutional structure establishes federal
exclusivity over foreign affairs, “on the one hand granting expansive foreign relations power to
the federal government, on the other denying them to the states.” (footnote omitted)).
251 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
252 Id. cl. 3.
253 Id.; see also W. Taylor Reveley, III, War Powers, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (1983)
(reviewing EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER (1982)) (suggesting that “the Framers expected the states to bear the major burden of
defense against sudden attack until Congress could act”).
254 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
249
250
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action.255 This power of legislative subjugation was an essential factor
in Fitzpatrick’s approval of Fourteenth Amendment abrogation and
its holding that no state can “deny to the general government the right
to exercise all its granted powers.”256 Moreover, the Fourteenth
Amendment provides states with relatively greater freedom to act
than the war powers. The Fourteenth Amendment allows state action
except in ways that violate individuals’ rights under that Amendment
and its enforcing legislation, while the war powers explicitly prohibit
various categories of state action and provide states the power to engage in a limited set of actions only where Congress allows it or in
extreme emergencies. This is a remarkable apportionment of power
that is wholly at odds with the idea of state sovereignty.257 Accordingly, if Congress can enact legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment giving individuals the ability to enforce their rights by suing
states, then Congress should be able to do the same under the War
Powers Clauses.258
That the Constitution’s text commands such an explicit subordination of states to the federal war powers does not come as a surprise.
The history of the Constitution itself is built in large part upon the
failure of the Articles of Confederation to adequately provide for the
national defense. Accordingly, George Washington’s official letter of
transmittal of the Constitution to Congress made clear that a primary
objective of the Convention was to centralize war powers with the
federal government.259 Many other Framers echoed this view.260 As
See infra Section III.C (discussing Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause).
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1976) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1880)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (“By imposing explicit limits on the
powers of the States and granting Congress the power to enforce them, the [Fourteenth] Amendment ‘fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power . . . .’ ” (quoting Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996))).
257 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (“When Congress enacts appropriate legislation to enforce
[the Fourteenth] Amendment, federal interests are paramount, and Congress may assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise unauthorized by the Constitution.” (citation
omitted)).
258 See Harner, supra note 5, at 199 (arguing that USERRA plaintiffs represent not only
themselves but also interests of federal government).
259 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 305–06.
260 See, e.g., id. at 483–89 (Edmund Randolph, objecting to Constitution, describing failures
of Confederation, including inability to raise federal troops or engage in other war-related activities); 2 id. at 217 (John Lansing criticizing Articles of Confederation: “First, it affords no defence
against foreign assault; second, no security to domestic tranquility.”); 2 id. at 522 (Wilson stating:
“How powerful and respectable must the body of militia appear under general and uniform
regulations! How disjointed, weak, and inefficient are they at present!”); 2 id. at 526 (Wilson
arguing that Confederation was unable to properly defend itself against the likely prospect of
255
256
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Professor Jack Goldsmith has noted, “One of the primary and least
controversial purposes of the Constitutional Convention was to
strengthen the foreign relations powers of the federal government visà-vis the states.”261
In sum, the text of the Constitution demonstrates a federal-state
balance of power that does not reflect a relationship between two sovereigns. It clearly provides the federal government almost the entirety
of the nation’s war powers, in addition to the authority to control the
limited number of permitted state actions. It is under this authority
that the SCRA and USERRA were enacted. Congress deemed it necessary to hold states liable for violations of servicemembers’ rights
under this legislation because of their importance to maintaining our
volunteer military forces. Additionally, the Constitution’s text indicates that it was the Framers’ intent not to allow states to undermine
this federal war powers policy through sovereign immunity claims or
other means.
4. Ratification Debates
Although most modern commentary on the war powers focuses
on the balance of power between the President and Congress,262 this
was at best a minor issue during the Convention and ratification debates. Instead, the major war powers question—indeed, one of the
most discussed constitutional issues generally—was the respective
roles of states and the federal government when it came to the nation’s defenses. This debate was unsurprising given that the nation’s
security was foremost in the minds of the Framers and the public at
the time.263
war). But see 3 id. at 46 (Patrick Henry, opposing Virginia’s ratification, arguing that the Confederation “carried us through a long and dangerous war; it rendered us victorious in that bloody
conflict with a powerful nation”).
261 Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1643 (1997); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 n.16 (Souter, J., dissenting); W. TAYLOR
REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS
AND OLIVE BRANCH? 3, 64–65 (1981) (arguing that Framers intended “Congress . . . to control
most American decisions about war and peace,” but recognized the need for a “single command” (the President) while at war); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 226–27 (John Marshall arguing that the aim of the new national government was to “protect the United States, and to
promote the general welfare. Protection, in time of war, is one of its principal objects.” States
“cannot do these things” and it was given “[b]y the national government only. . . . It is, then,
necessary to give the government that power, in time of peace, which the necessity of war will
render indispensable, or else we shall be attacked unprepared.”).
262 See generally, e.g., REVELEY, supra note 261.
263 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 13–14 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“Among the
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The state ratification conventions spent considerable time discussing the new federal government’s almost exclusive control over
war powers, particularly in combination with the federal taxation
power that was to finance the nation’s defenses. These debates clearly
demonstrate that the states were well aware that ratification of the
Constitution meant that they had little role in military affairs, and
what authority they did have was entirely under the control of the
federal government. This extreme imbalance leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the states also understood that they lacked the power
to thwart or otherwise contradict federal war powers actions, including via claims of sovereign immunity.
This Article comprehensively examined two primary sources to
illustrate the states’ understanding when ratifying the Constitution:
Jonathan Elliot’s Convention Debates and The Federalist Papers. Because of war powers’ prominence during ratification, there are a multitude of relevant discussions from that time, many of which made
similar points. What follows, therefore, is merely a representative
sample of those discussions, highlighted based on factors such as clarity, relevance, diversity of view, and identity of the speaker. The sheer
volume of examples underscores two facts: (1) the balance of war
powers between the states and federal government was a central issue
in the ratification debates, not a mere afterthought or overlooked
topic; and (2) the ratifying states were crystal clear in their understanding that the Constitution housed the war powers almost exclusively with the federal government.
a. Balance of War Powers
While contemplating ratification of the Constitution, the states
were under no illusion regarding their subordination to the federal
government when it came to war powers. Both proponents and opponents of the Constitution stated explicitly that under the plan of the
Convention the war powers were the near-exclusive province of the
federal government. The war powers were not an ancillary topic. To
the contrary, along with the related tax power, the federal war powers—particularly control over state militias—were one of the primary
matters of discussion.
Alexander Hamilton spoke at length about the federal war powers vis-à-vis the states and, given his central role in drafting the Constitution and getting it ratified, as well as the modern Supreme Court’s
many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of
providing for their safety seems to be the first.”).
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reliance on his views,264 his perspective may be the most persuasive of
any Founder. For instance, during New York’s ratification debates,
Hamilton was unequivocal that the constitutional war powers resided
solely within the federal sphere:
The great leading objects of the federal government, in
which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domestic peace,
and provide for the common defence. In these are comprehended the regulation of commerce,—that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse,—the support of armies and
navies, and of the civil administration. . . . This principle assented to, let us inquire what are the objects of the state governments. Have they to provide against foreign invasion?
Have they to maintain fleets and armies? Have they any concern in the regulation of commerce, the procuring alliances,
or forming treaties of peace? No. Their objects are merely
civil and domestic . . . .265
According to Hamilton, federal control of military matters was
unconstrained, as there was “no limitation of that authority . . . to
provide for the defence and protection of the community,” especially
“any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the national forces.”266
Hamilton stressed not only that the federal government was
solely responsible for the nation’s defense and foreign relations, but
also that the states were subservient to the federal war powers. He
emphasized that when Congress exercises its authority to raise troops,
call for supplies, and borrow money, “states are bound by the solemn
ties of honor, of justice, of religion, to comply without reserve.”267
Thus, Hamilton affirmed, Congress has “an unlimited discretion to
make requisitions of men and money—to govern the army and navy—
to direct their operations” and Congress’s requisitions are “made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the most
solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them” by the
federal government.268
See infra note 328.
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 350 (arguing further that states cannot be permitted to
interfere with federal revenue collection, lest they interfere with national defense).
266 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 148 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
267 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 352. Hamilton acknowledged the legitimacy of state
governments and their connection to individuals’ liberty, but argued that there cannot be two
supreme powers. Id. at 352–53.
268 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 148 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stat264
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Hamilton’s linkage of the federal taxation and war powers was
not coincidental. The Constitution’s proponents explicitly and repeatedly connected the federal government’s need for revenue to the nation’s security.269 According to this view, without the power to tax, the
government would be unable to secure the nation’s defenses.270 Opponents stressed this linkage as well, albeit to lament the states’ limited
powers.271 The former view, of course, prevailed, as the ratifying states
agreed that the nation’s survival depended on federal authority to use
tax revenue to defend the nation as a whole, free from state
interference.
It is unsurprising that Hamilton would stress the importance of
finance to war powers given his experience in both areas.272 But he
was far from alone. In the New York ratification debates, Robert Livingston stressed that states did not need the power of the purse, for
they “have not to pay the civil list, to maintain the army or navy.”273
Moreover, Livingston continued, the states should not claim war powers from the federal government because the states were ill-suited to
defend the nation—emphasizing his point by describing a political cartoon in which thirteen hands awkwardly hold a sword that cannot be
moved without cutting off one of the hands.274 In The Federalist No. 3,
future-Chief Justice John Jay described at great length why federal
control over military matters would keep the country safer than giving
the several states such power.275 Oliver Ellsworth defended the federal
government’s power to tax and its importance to federal war powers,
noting that “[t]he state debt, which now lies heavy upon us, arose
ing also that “the United States should command whatever resources” from the states that it
“judged requisite to ‘the ‘common defence and general welfare’ ”).
269 See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 386 (Livingston stating that “[i]f it be necessary
to trust our defence to the Union, it is necessary that we should trust it with the sword to defend
us, and the purse to give the sword effect.”).
270 Id. at 468 (Wilson arguing that Congress needs the power of taxation to fulfill duty to
“keep up standing armies, and command the militia”); 3 id. at 393–94 (Madison, arguing for
federal power of both sword and purse, divided between the President and Congress).
271 3 id. at 395 (Patrick Henry opposing Constitution: “Where are the purse and sword of
Virginia? They must go to Congress.”).
272 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
273 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 385–86 (“How is Congress to defend us without a
sword?”).
274 Id. at 386.
275 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (noting advantages including prevention of a state’s
problems from spreading to others, avoiding intentional or accidental violations of treaties, the
most capable representatives will be recommended to serve in federal government, and that war
often results from “passions and interests of a part than of the whole”).
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from the want of powers in the federal system.”276 The federal government, not the states, would assume financial responsibility for security, for “[i]t will lie upon the national government to defend all the
states, to defend all its members, from hostile attacks. The United
States will bear the whole burden of war.”277
Ratification debates in other states echoed these sentiments. In
Pennsylvania, future-Justice James Wilson emphasized that the federal
taxation power was vital to national security, otherwise a strong foreign navy could shut off import duties and Congress would be unable
to raise funds from unwilling states.278 He then turned to objections
against Congress’s power to raise and maintain standing armies. Declaring himself “surprised” that this objection was ever made, Wilson
noted that all governments have this power: “A government without
the power of defence! [I]t is a solecism.”279 He also defended the constitutional balance of war powers, under which states had the power to
train militias that would be firmly under the control of the federal
government, as necessary because “uniformity of arms, accoutrements, and discipline” was vital to the nation’s defense.280 Thomas McKean reiterated this division of power, emphasizing that while states
could name officers and train the militia under Congress’s direction,
the federal government was to “organize, arm, and discipline the militia[s]” and “have also the power of calling them forth for the purpose
of executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections, and repelling invasions.”281
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDCONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 191.

276
ERAL

277

Id. (emphasis added).

278

Id. at 501–02 (noting also that states did not have sovereignty, the people did).

279

Id. at 520 (stressing the value of peacetime standing armies, particularly federal ones).

Id. at 521–22 (arguing that without uniformity, a militia is “no more than a mob in a
camp” and that he expected that Militia Clauses “would have received plaudits instead of censures”); see also 3 id. at 389–91 (George Nicholas supporting federal war powers as necessary for
national security, especially the power to call up nonconsenting state militias).
280

281 2 id. at 537 (responding to an objection that militia members could be called to another
state or against their conscience by stressing that Congress had this power, but would not normally use it); see also id. at 384 (Livingston sarcastically asking “Have the state governments the
power of war and peace, of raising troops, and making treaties?” and noting that states only have
limited power to regulate militias); A Native of Virginia: Observations upon the Proposed Plan of
Federal Government, in 9 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA (2), at
677–78 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1990) (anonymous letter arguing that constitutional war
powers confirmed antecedent principles that states had “already yielded to the present Congress”); Cassius III: To Richard Henry Lee, in 9 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE
STATES: VIRGINIA (2), supra, at 749 (similar argument from opponent of Constitution).
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In Virginia, Edmund Randolph, who opposed the Constitution
during the Convention but supported it during ratification, was explicit in his understanding that “Congress had power to make peace
and war under the old Confederation,” and the “exclusive power of
war . . . .”282 James Madison, one of the primary authors of the Constitution, was equally clear about the need for exclusive federal war
powers, especially in light of state militias’ weakness, which the Revolutionary War exposed:
Ought it to be known to foreign nations that the general government of the United States of America has no power to
raise and support an army, even in the utmost danger, when
attacked by external enemies? Would not their knowledge of
such a circumstance stimulate them to fall upon us? If, sir,
Congress be not invested with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by ambition or avarice, will be invited, by our
weakness, to attack us; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans, would certainly be attended with success, when only
opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia.283
The view of Madison and most others was that confederations in
general,284 and the “rotten” Articles of Confederation in particular,
were unable to adequately provide for the national defense.285 Interstate rivalries286 and the lack of a central government with authority to
raise funds and control the military meant that the Confederation
would fall apart.287 Decentralized control over the military would also
leave the nation’s security at risk by states being individually “flat3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDCONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 28–29 (emphasis added).
283 Id. at 91 (supporting standing federal army); see also id. at 112–13 (Francis Corbin,
arguing that reliance on militias meant that “ignorance of arms and negligence of farming will
ensue”).
284 See supra note 225.
285 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 233 (Hamilton asking: “Shall we take the old Confederation, as the basis of a new system? . . . Certainly not. Will any man, who entertains a wish for the
safety of his country, trust the sword and the purse with a single assembly organized on principles so defective—so rotten?”); see also id. at 213–16 (Livingston noting that Constitution provided federal government many of the same powers, including raising troops, as Articles of
Confederation intended but failed at because it gave states too much power); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 45, at 308 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that federal war powers was
“essential[] to the security of the people of America against foreign danger”).
286 See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 132–33 (Madison describing failures of New
England confederation).
287 See id. at 134–35 (Madison stressing that Confederation could not be credited with Revolutionary War success and would leave the country too weak to defend itself).
282
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tered” or “seduced” into not assisting others by logistical questions
regarding who had the authority to equip the military, provide orders,
and make peace, and by foreign nations taking advantage of these
weaknesses.288 Only by establishing a federal government that could
raise funds from all states to ensure the nation’s security would the
country survive.289
Based on the volume of comments during the ratification debates, the federal taxation power was among the most controversial
elements of the Constitution. But to the majority supporting this
power, it was absolutely necessary to the nation’s defense against external threats and internal strife.290 For example, if faced with an external threat and no ability to raise funds against recalcitrant states,
the federal government would be compelled to demand payment
through the use of force.291
Opponents of ratification were no less clear on the federal government’s war powers. Indeed, one may not see a more forceful delineation of those powers than John Williams’s objections to the
Constitution during the New York ratification debates. He criticized
the Constitution as granting “indefinite” powers that would allow
Congress, should it deem it appropriate for the common defense or
general welfare, to “essentially destroy[]” state governments “without
any check or impediment.”292 Appointing senators was no safeguard
for the states, for they lacked the “command of the purse and the
sword” to “secure their rights.”293 In conclusion, he asked “[i]s not the
power, both over taxation and the militia, wrested from their hands by

288 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 4–5 (John Jay) (arguing that lack of strong national war
powers would leave regions fighting amongst themselves, at risk of hostilities by foreign governments, and “formidable only to each other”); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 6–8, 25 (Alexander
Hamilton) (similar).

2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDCONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 132 (Samuel Adams arguing that limiting Congress’s
taxation power to wartime would deprive federal government “the necessary means of providing
for the public defence”).
289

ERAL

R

290 See 3 id. at 82 (Randolph criticizing Confederation and urging that “[w]ithout adequate
powers vested in Congress, America cannot be respectable in the eyes of other nations. Congress . . . ought to be fully vested with power to support the Union, protect the interests of the
United States, . . . and defend them from external invasions and insults, and internal
insurrections”).
291

See infra notes 305, 318.

2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDCONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 338.
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this Constitution, and bestowed upon the general government? Yes, sir,
it is.”294
Similarly, the antifederalists of Virginia—most notably Patrick
Henry and George Mason—railed against the breadth of federal war
powers during that state’s ratification debates. Henry extolled the
value of state-controlled militias, decrying what he viewed as the Constitution’s oppressive control over them: “Have we the means of resisting disciplined armies, when our only defence, the militia, is put
into the hands of Congress?”295 Perhaps even worse in Henry’s mind
was the prospect of a standing army under the control of a Congress
that controlled the militias and could “execute the execrable commands of tyranny.”296 With power over the militias “given up to Congress,” Henry asked, “how are you to punish them? . . . What
resistance could be made? The attempt would be madness. You will
find all the strength of this country in the hands of your enemies . . . .”297 Henry especially derided the Militia Clauses, under
which Congress’s “control over our last and best defence is
unlimited.”298
If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they
will be useless: the states can do neither—this power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing officers
over men not disciplined or armed is ridiculous; so that this
pretended little remains of power left to the states may, at
the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nugatory.299
Id. (emphasis added).
3 id. at 48 (noting also the lack of current insurrections in Virginia and “no real danger
from Europe”); see also id. at 214 (Monroe, opposing Virginia’s ratification, arguing the same).
The question whether war with a European power was looming was a major issue of the day. See
id. at 132 (Madison warning of impending war if Constitution not ratified); id. at 227 (Marshall
warning of future threats from Europe); THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay) (same). Edmund
Randolph responded to Henry by emphasizing that if the Confederation stood, Virginia would
remain unable “to raise an army to protect her citizens from internal seditions and external
attacks” or “to raise a navy to protect her trade and her coasts against descents and invasions.” 3
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 114.
296 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 51.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 52.
299 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 56 (decrying Virginia’s lack of power under Constitution; the federal government has forts, garrisons, and arms, while states’ power “is reduced to
. . . nothing”); see also id. at 410–12 (objecting to “very alarming power” of Congress to raise and
support standing armies, Congress’s ability to “make militia laws” for states, and possible use of
federal army to enforce laws). But see id. at 414–15 (Madison responding that all governments
must use military force at times).
294
295
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Henry—an avowed critic of the Constitution—laid bare the extent to which the states were completely subservient to the federal war
powers.300 Of course, he was in the minority and unable to stop ratification of the Constitution which permitted the federal standing army
that legislation like the SCRA and USERRA support.301
To the extent states possessed any war powers, it was through
their militias. By one account, at the end of the Revolutionary War the
states combined had, under their nominal control, militias composed
of approximately 330,000 members.302 But they were hardly viewed as
sufficient to protect the new nation; instead, it was widely acknowledged that they were temporary soldiers eager to return to their lives,
typically as farmers.303 These militias were ultimately under Congress’s authority, as required by both the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution.
Federal control over the militias illustrates the extent to which
the plan of the Convention did not contemplate states’ possession of
independent war powers or the authority to thwart federal war powers
actions. It was also foremost in the minds of the Constitution’s opponents. For instance, Henry complained that the states’ minor role in
operating militias was fully under federal power: “The power of arming the militia, and the means of purchasing arms, are taken from the
states by the paramount powers of Congress. If Congress will not arm
them, they will not be armed at all.”304 Hamilton, however, strongly
defended this relationship, arguing that if the federal government is
300 See id. at 168 (Henry criticizing federal ability to build “fortifications and garrisons” in
states whose “legislature[s] will have no power over them” and magazines “free from the control” of state legislatures: “Are we at last brought to such an humiliating and debasing degradation, that we cannot be trusted with arms for our own defence?”). George Mason was
particularly concerned with the prospect of a federal standing army, which he viewed as a threat
to liberty. Id. at 380.
301 See supra note 283; 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 536–37 (Thomas McKean arguing “[t]he power of raising and supporting armies is not only necessary” for national defense (as
are taxes to pay for it), “but is enjoyed by the present Congress”); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 8, 11,
29 (Alexander Hamilton) (stressing necessity of standing army and navy); THE FEDERALIST NO.
25, at 162 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing not to “be the dupes of”
suggestion that militias were sufficient to defend country; “regular and disciplined army” was
needed).
302 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 76.
303 Id. at 77–80 (Randolph arguing that militias were insufficient to protect nation).
304 Id. at 169 (“Congress have an unlimited power over both [sword and purse]: they are
entirely given up by us.”). But see id. at 178 (Henry Lee III responding that states could still arm
and discipline militias if Congress failed to do so but, noting as former member of militia, he
thought them unreliable).
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responsible for the nation’s security, it should control the forces
through which that security is attained.305 He emphasized as well the
economies of scale in establishing training schemes for the militias
which, if left to individual states, would be unnecessarily costly and
ineffective.306
The power of Congress to “call forth” militias was also explicitly
debated during the Virginia ratification debates, particularly in a dialogue between George Mason and James Madison. Mason warned
that federal power over militias would, without additional limits, “produce dreadful oppressions.”307 Under the Constitution, Mason asserted, “Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining
the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has
an exclusive right to arm them . . . .”308 Mason also complained to
Thomas Jefferson about “the almost unlimited Authority over the Militia of the several States,” which would allow the federal government
to disarm them or render them useless.309
Even Mason, despite being an avowed opponent of the Constitution and its grant of federal war powers, recognized the need for federal control over state militias—albeit with more limits. But these
limits were not adopted, largely for reasons that Madison expressed in
response to Mason. Although noting their shared concern with a
standing army, Madison proposed to “render it unnecessary” by giving “the general government full power to call forth the militia, and to
exert the whole natural strength of the Union, when necessary.”310
Following this exchange, the Virginia ratification debates took on
the appearance of a public relations campaign, with opponents expressing outrage at the prospect of federal tyranny and oppression of the
305 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (also noting economic costs of requiring too much of part-time soldiers and arguing that a federal government unable to control
militias must resort to more extreme measures during emergencies).
306 See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 184.
307 Id. at 378 (“I conceive the general government ought to have power over the militia, but
it ought to have some bounds” such as requiring state consent before another state’s militia
entered its borders; in times of emergency, states would not withhold their consent); see also id.
at 416 (“[S]tate governments ought to have the control of the militia, except when they were
absolutely necessary for general purposes.”).
308 See id. at 379.
309 Excerpt of Letter from George Mason to Thomas Jefferson (May 26), in 9 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA (2), at 883 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
1990).
310 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 381. Madison also emphasized that a national defense
would be stronger than a fragmented, state military apparatus. See id. at 382.
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states and proponents downplaying federal power. For instance,
Madison said that the states and federal government would have concurrent authority over the militias.311 He envisioned that states normally would arm and discipline militias, although the federal
government would have the authority to call upon the “aggregate
strength of the Union” and take control of militias when necessary.312
Moreover, he attempted to assuage Henry313 by stating that as long as
they were not “in the actual service” of the federal government, “the
state governments might do what they thought proper with the militia . . . .”314 Henry was unmoved because the Militia Clauses “expressly vested the general government with power” to call forth
militias and, therefore, the power to suppress insurrections and other
actions were “exclusively given to Congress.”315 In response, Madison
described states’ normal ability to govern militias as a check on federal power, although he also stressed that ultimate control must be
federal to ensure that the nation would be properly defended.316 This
need was especially pertinent if faced with a foreign invasion, which
required the “safety of the Union and particular states” to be in the
hands of the “general government[’s]” war powers.317 And, as
311 Id.; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that militias could handle minor insurrections, but federal standing army was needed to control bigger problems). But
see 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 385–87 (Henry, disputing Madison’s notion that power over
the militias was concurrent, arguing that if truly concurrent, states could arm and discipline
militias).
312 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 382–83 (noting also that both executive and legislature
had war power roles and would therefore serve as checks on the other); id. at 416 (emphasizing
that states would appoint militia officers and govern militias “except that part which was called
into the actual service of the United States”).
313 Id. at 416 (Henry asking “what authority the state governments had over the militia”).
314 Id. (giving examples of suppressing insurrections, quelling riots, and aiding other states).
Madison also viewed states’ ability to appoint militia officers as providing local influence in
military affairs. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 29
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that states had influence over militias through appointment of
officers).
315 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 416–17; see also id. at 422 (arguing “states had no right
to call forth the militia to suppress insurrections, [etc.]”); id. at 423 (asserting that prohibition
against states engaging in war except when invaded means that states “cannot suppress insurrections” or other domestic violence); id. (stating that “Congress, and Congress only, can call forth
the militia”).
316 Id. at 424 (arguing that states cannot defend the nation and that limits on states’ ability
to suppress insurrections were necessary because “a whole state may be in insurrection against
the Union”).
317 Id. at 424–25.
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Madison stressed in The Federalist No. 45, increasing the federal government’s authority over the national defense lowers the risk of dangers requiring it to invoke its “ascendency” over the states.318
In sum, the sole substantive question regarding states’ war powers is whether states have any such powers, not whether those powers
are completely subservient to the federal government. Both supporters and opponents of the Constitution at the time of its ratification
declared that states had no war powers at all. Others, in turn, acknowledged some role of states in operating militias, albeit under the
control of Congress.319 The latter, more nuanced view, seems most
supported by the record. Those claiming no state role whatsoever appear to have been speaking either in more general terms320 or exaggerating in an attempt to prevent ratification.321 In contrast, the text of
the Articles of Confederation, the text of the Constitution, and facts
on the ground all recognize a limited role for states, under the federal
government’s ultimate control.
In the end, however, disagreements about whether states had any
war powers are immaterial. There was unanimity on the more important factor regarding war powers abrogation: that whatever war powers authority states possessed was exceptionally limited and entirely
under the control of the federal government. The federal power to
take over state militias—a power that none of the Framers disputed—
is key to validating war powers abrogation. Just as the Fourteenth
Amendment’s grant of federal control over states was integral to its
abrogation, the subordination of state war powers to the federal government demonstrates the lack of state sovereign immunity in this
arena.322 That is, states were not and are not sovereigns when it comes
to war powers. It is simply inconceivable that the Founders—whether
supporters or opponents of the Constitution—would have thought
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
Many delegates also referred to states’ ability to arm or discipline the militias if Congress failed to do so and to engage in war during imminent danger. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra
note 212, at 206 (Randolph); id. at 419–21 (Marshall); id. at 427–29 (George Nicholas); id. at 440
(Edmund Pendleton); id. at 645 (James Johnson).
320 See, e.g., 2 id. at 165 (Samuel Stillman contrasting states’ limited duties to federal government’s “great, numerous, and extensive” objects, such as “war and peace”); 3 id. at 38 (Pendleton stating that during Confederation, “Congress was empowered to make war and peace”).
321 3 id. at 379–80 (Mason arguing that “[s]hould the national government wish to render
the militia useless, they may neglect them, and let them perish, in order to have a pretence of
establishing a standing army” and “[t]he general government ought . . . to have some such
power. But we need not give them power to abolish our militia”); supra note 308.
322 See infra Section II.A.4.b.
318
319
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that states could overrule a federal war powers decision.323 This is particularly true with regard to the federal government’s ability to maintain its armed forces,324 which is the aim of both the SCRA and
USERRA.325 Barring states ability to interfere with the nation’s defense was one of the key goals of the Constitution, and arguments that
the same Constitution provides states immunity when they violate the
federal war powers rights of servicemembers directly conflicts with
that purpose.326
b. State Immunity under the Constitution
The Constitution’s text and contemporaneous interpretations are
replete with descriptions of the federal government’s near-exclusive
war powers, yet there was far less discussion of state sovereign immunity against private lawsuits. This is true, despite the fact that the potential for individuals—primarily creditors—suing states for money
was a known issue.327 This concern was directly addressed by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, which the modern Supreme
Court has consistently relied upon as the central historical explanation
of the Founders’ approach to state immunity.328
Hamilton’s explanation of state sovereign immunity begins with
The Federalist No. 81’s statement that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 407 (Clay, opposing Virginia’s ratification, stating that “although the militia officers were appointed by the state governments, . . . they were
sworn to obey the superior power of Congress”); id. at 417–18 (William Grayson opposing Virginia’s ratification and criticizing argument that Constitution’s republican government clause
gave states concurrent power over militias, because “Congress had the exclusive direction and
control of [militias]”).
324 See 2 id. at 66–67 (Christopher Gore arguing that federal government was needed to
provide for common defense, maintain standing armies and navies, and declare war to properly
defend country); id. at 68 (William Phillips arguing that federal government needed power to
maintain standing army); id. at 96–97 (Theodore Sedgwick supporting Congress’s ability to
maintain standing armies for two years).
325 See supra notes 21, 25.
326 See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 278–79 (Livingston arguing that even under Confederation, Congress had war powers that states were bound to follow).
327 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 105 n.4 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
328 See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 752 (2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716–17 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999); Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 54, 70 n.13; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1890). Justice Souter, citing disparate
views on state immunity in the ratification debates, cast doubt upon the Court’s historical analysis. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 775–81, 792 (Souter, J., dissenting).
323
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consent. . . . Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states . . . .”329 Although the Court has frequently relied upon this statement,330 it has
conspicuously ignored Hamilton’s next sentence, which emphasizes
that there are exceptions: “The circumstances which are necessary to
produce an alienation of state sovereignty, were discussed in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here.”331 The discussion of these exceptions, or “alienations,” is found in The Federalist
No. 32, where Hamilton stated:
[A]s the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial Union
or consolidation, the State Governments would clearly retain
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which
were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United
States. This exclusive delegation or rather this alienation of
State sovereignty would only exist in three cases; where the
constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority
to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority
to the Union and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to
the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.332
Thus, according to Hamilton, there are three categories of exceptions to state sovereign immunity. The historical record reveals that
federal war powers satisfies all three.
The first exception applies to areas in which the Constitution “in
express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union.”333 As described above, the Constitution’s text could not be more clear as to
the federal government’s exclusive authority over war powers.334
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 548–49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See cases cited supra note 328; Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hamilton was referring only to immunity “with respect to diversity cases applying state
contract law”).
331 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 145–46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting “difficulties that accrue to the
majority from reliance on The Federalist No. 81”).
332 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see
also Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d and remanded,
541 U.S. 440 (2004) (holding that bankruptcy abrogation falls under Hamilton’s “alienations”).
333 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
334 See supra Section II.A.4.a; Goldsmith, supra note 261, at 1714 (stating that in “traditional foreign relations contexts, federal exclusivity is effectively assured by Article I, Section 10
and by extant federal enactments”); cf. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 236 (1996) (“The
drafters of the Articles vested all war powers in the Continental Congress.”); id. at 182 (noting
329
330
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Moreover, the Framers and ratifying states were unanimous in the understanding that the Constitution granted the federal government exclusive war powers authority.335 At most, states retained the ability to
name officers and train militias, but that authority was entirely subservient to the federal government, which sets forth the rules for training militias and has the authority to call them into federal service at
any time.336 Hamilton stressed this reality both in the ratification debates337 and The Federalist Papers, where he emphasized that the federal government’s war powers “ought to exist without limitation.”338
This included federal demands for state military resources, which
“were made constitutionally binding upon the States.”339
The strongest historical argument for war powers abrogation may
be its fulfillment of Hamilton’s second exception: where the Constitution “granted in one instance an authority to the Union and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority.”340 This is the
same type of exception that the Fitzpatrick Court found persuasive
under the Fourteenth Amendment.341 The case for war powers is as
strong, if not stronger, for the Constitution’s text repeatedly and explicitly grants federal war powers authority while at the same time
prohibiting state war powers.342
Finally, Hamilton’s third exception applies where the Constitution “granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority
in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.”343 The Founders’ repeated warnings about the dangers of state
interference with the federal government’s responsibility for the national defense344 show that war powers may be the paradigm for Hamilton’s exceptions to state sovereign immunity. USERRA is an
illustrative example. The statute’s purpose is to ensure a sufficient
number of volunteer servicemembers to defend the nation by encourJohn Marshall’s statement that President was “the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations”).
335

See supra Section II.A.4.a.

See supra note 248; infra notes 369–70; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1495–1500 (1987).
336

337

See supra notes 265–68, 305–06.

338

THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,1961).

339

Id. at 148 (emphasis added).

340

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

341

See supra notes 64–72.

342

See supra Section II.A.3.

343

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,1961).

344

See supra notes 267–68, 308–09.
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aging service through various employment protections.345 Allowing
state employers to assert sovereign immunity directly undermines
USERRA’s national security goal by eliminating these protections for
state employees and applicants. Thus, the idea that states could ignore
and contradict a federal war powers action like USERRA is “totally
contradictory and repugnant” to the text and history of the Constitution, under which states are subordinate to the federal government in
the war powers arena.346
Hamilton’s framework also helps to differentiate war powers abrogation from commerce abrogation. Many commentators during the
ratification debates discussed federal power over the “sword”347 and
the “purse,” which typically referred to the federal taxation power.348
According to Hamilton, federal taxation is an alienation against which
states are unable to assert immunity.349 As a result, the federal war
powers are aligned more with areas like taxation and foreign affairs,
which do not permit state sovereign immunity claims, than the commerce powers.350
In sum, history shows that the states ratified the Constitution
knowing full well that it provided the federal government almost total
See supra notes 23–30.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,1961); see
Jennings v. Ill. Off. of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that
USERRA’s abrogation was “an exercise of power delegated to it ‘in the plan of the convention,’
which includes the power to make the states amenable to damage actions in federal courts”);
Goldsmith, supra note 261, at 1619–20 (emphasizing that the Constitution’s foreign power provisions “give the federal political branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations
without interference or limitation by the states”).
347 “Sword” could refer either to military matters or a government’s enforcement of laws.
See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 349 (Hamilton, discussing separation of powers between executive’s “sword” of enforcing laws and legislature’s control of the “purse”).
348 See supra notes 265–73.
349 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
350 See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 227 (Marshall arguing that federal power to tax
was necessary to raise armies and protect nation); Cantwell v. County of San Mateo, 631 F.2d
631, 636 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that war powers are distinguishable from commerce powers);
Schell v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3263, 1981 WL 2289, at *2–3 (S.D.
Ohio June 1, 1981) (holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that “responsibility of the national government
to raise and support the military places the national government in a special position vis a vis the
states,” and therefore “[d]ifferent policy considerations are raised by the Commerce and the War
Powers Clauses . . . [and] our system of federalism requires greater deference to federal interests
where the War Powers are involved”); see also Goldsmith, supra note 261, at 1677 (asserting that
concurrent federal-state military authority likely is harmful to the country’s foreign relations
interests); Althouse, supra note 102, at 644 n.62 (arguing that, unlike commerce power, there is
little value in diverse state war powers solutions).
345
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control over war powers. Moreover, according to the Supreme Court’s
favored commentary—Hamilton’s Federalist No. 81—the states’ subservience to federal war powers includes an exception to state sovereign immunity. In other words, the plan of the Convention leads to
only one reasonable conclusion: states do not have the power to assert
immunity against private rights of action created pursuant to the federal government’s war powers.
B. Practice and Precedent Following Constitution
Legal precedents and practices of the Constitution do not provide
a direct answer to war powers abrogation because the Supreme Court
has never addressed the issue directly. That dearth of evidence, however, is telling. Only after the Court’s Seminole Tribe decision does it
appear that states began claiming sovereign immunity against war
powers abrogation in earnest.351 Until then, it appears that states did
not think they had the ability to assert sovereign immunity against war
powers legislation. That understanding is supported not only by the
history and structure of the Constitution, but also by the practice of
Congress and the President, whose near-exclusive war powers authority, including their ability to limit state interference with those powers,
has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court.
Federal attempts to exercise the constitutional war powers began
as early as 1792, soon after ratification, when Congress enacted a statute establishing a “Uniform Militia” throughout the country.352 The
statute’s requirement that able-bodied men of a certain age be enrolled in the militia and self-equipped largely was ignored and the
statute eventually was repealed in 1901, when President Theodore
Roosevelt determined that the militia system at the time was an abject
failure.353 In response, Congress established two militias made up of
all able-bodied males between 18 and 45 years old.354 The “organized
militia” consisted of servicemen in what was named the “National
Guard” of each state, while all other servicemen were members of the
“reserve” or “unorganized” militia.355 Thus, from the earliest days of
the Constitution, the federal government exercised its war powers authority over states.
351 There were a few pre-Seminole Tribe cases involving state sovereign immunity claims,
most of which were consistently rejected. See, e.g., Jennings, 589 F.2d at 938.
352 See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 341 (1990) (citing 1 Stat. 271 (1792)).
353 Id. at 341–42.
354 Id. at 342–43 (citing The Dick Act, 32 Stat. 775 (1903)).
355 Id. at 342.
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Early Court decisions also recognized the power of the federal
government’s war powers over the states, including state sovereignty.
In McCulloch v. Maryland,356 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, held that under the Constitution “the powers of sovereignty
are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to
the other.”357 And, of course, in Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court concluded that the Constitution permitted private rights of action against
nonconsenting states.358 Although the decision was subsequently repudiated, it was decided entirely by Founders359 less than five years after
the Constitution’s ratification and, therefore, provides important insights into the original understanding of the Constitution.360 Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment did not disturb Chisholm’s view on war
powers. Justice Cushing, who had been Vice President of Massachusetts’s ratification convention, emphasized in Chisholm that “[o]ne design of the general Government was for managing the great affairs of
peace and war and the general defence; which were impossible to be
conducted, with safety, by the States separately.”361 In addition, Chief
Justice Jay—a member of the Continental Congress, delegate to the
New York ratification convention, and one of the authors of The Federalist Papers—explained that:
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 410.
358 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793).
359 The majority opinions were authored by: Chief Justice John Jay, who was a delegate to
New York’s ratification convention and authored some of The Federalist Papers; Justice John
Blair, who was a delegate to both the Constitutional Convention and Virginia’s ratification convention; Justice James Wilson, who was a delegate to both the Constitutional Convention and
Virginia’s ratification convention; and Justice William Cushing, who was not a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, but was Vice President of the Massachusetts ratification convention.
See id. at 450, 453, 466, 469; see also 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 16, 496; 2 id., supra, at 2; 3
id., supra, at 654. Dissenting Justice James Iredell was not a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, but was a delegate to North Carolina’s initial ratification convention, which neither
ratified nor rejected the Constitution; Iredell was not present at the subsequent convention that
voted to ratify. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429 (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 1.
360 The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of early Supreme Court decisions
when determining the intent behind constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 745–46 (1999). Moreover, Chisholm’s subsequent repudiation does not mean that the Founders on the Court got the history wrong; the Eleventh Amendment may be explained as a political alteration of the Constitution’s original intent.
361 2 U.S. at 467.
356
357
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Whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people
for their own necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the
power and prerogatives of States. This is, as it were, a selfevident proposition; at least it cannot be contested. Thus the
power of declaring war, making peace, raising and supporting armies for public defence . . . are lodged in Congress; and
are a most essential abridgement of State sovereignty.362
Chief Justice Jay’s statement that the federal war powers are a
“most essential abridgement of State sovereignty” is unambiguous
and bears repeating.363 One of the foremost Founders declared in a
Supreme Court decision that it is a “self-evident proposition” that the
Constitution did not permit state sovereignty to interfere with federal
war powers.364 Nothing in the Court’s subsequent history or modern
sovereign immunity jurisprudence negates this understanding.
Following the nation’s next armed conflict, the War of 1812, the
Court was called upon to specifically address the federal government’s
control of state militia members. In Martin v. Mott,365 a member of the
New York state militia challenged his court martial for refusing to report for federal military service.366 Per the President’s war orders, the
Governor of New York detailed parts of the state militia “to do military duty in the service of the United States”; Mott failed to report for
duty and, pursuant to a 1795 federal statute, was court martialed and
fined.367
In upholding Mott’s court martial, the Court clarified the federal
government’s authority over state militias. It upheld the 1795 act as
“within the constitutional authority of Congress” over the militia,
even though it allowed the federal government to court martial a state
militia member who was never in federal military service.368 Moreover, the Court held that the President’s authority to determine
“whether the exigencies contemplated in the Constitution of the
United States” and the 1795 act, “in which the President has authority
to call forth the militia . . . is exclusively vested in the President, and
his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.”369 The President, the
Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
Id.
364 Id.
365 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
366 Id. at 19.
367 Id. at 21–22.
368 Id. at 29, 33.
369 Id. at 19 (quoting the President’s authority “to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions”).
362
363
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Court emphasized, is the “exclusive judge” as to whether such an exigency has occurred, and “[i]t is not necessary . . . that the particular
exigency actually existed. It is sufficient that the President has determined it, and all other persons are bound by his decision.”370 This is a
remarkable level of control over a nominally state institution. According to the Court, the President can call state militias into federal service without showing the existence of an actual exigency and without
review by any other official or institution. Additionally, state militia
service members can be court martialed for failing to follow the President’s order. The decision, therefore, provides a near-contemporaneous understanding of federal war powers, which permits the federal
government to fully take control of state militias and their members,
without review or recourse.
Later, in the 1871 Tarble’s Case,371 the Court addressed whether a
state court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to discharge
an individual held by the U.S. military.372 The Court held that state
courts lacked this power because matters left to the federal government—particularly the war powers—are beyond the reach of state jurisdiction.373 According to the Court:
[The federal government’s] control over the [war powers] is
plenary and exclusive. It can determine, without question
from any State authority, how the armies shall be raised,
whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at
which the soldier shall be received, and the period for which
he shall be taken, the compensation he shall be allowed, and
the service to which he shall be assigned. And it can provide
the rules for the government and regulation of the forces after they are raised, define what shall constitute military offences, and prescribe their punishment. No interference with
the execution of this power of the National government in
the formation, organization, and government of its armies by
any State officials could be permitted without greatly impairing the efficiency, if it did not utterly destroy, this branch of
the public service. . . . It is manifest that the powers of the
National government could not be exercised with energy and
efficiency at all times, if its acts could be interfered with and

370

Id. at 28–29, 32.

371

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).

372

Id. at 402.

373

Id. at 406.
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controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another
sovereignty.374
The Court’s concern with the federal government’s ability to raise
armies, including one made up of volunteers, is directly comparable to
abrogation under USERRA. If federal war powers exist “without
question from any State authority” and should suffer “[n]o interference . . . by any State officials,”375 then state employers should not be
permitted to assert immunity to avoid responsibility for violating servicemembers’ USERRA rights.
During World War II, the Court reiterated the federal government’s constitutional authority to engage in war powers acts free from
state constraint or opposition. In the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief
Act of 1940 (“SSCRA”), precursor to the SCRA, Congress used its
war powers to abrogate states’ ability to tax servicemembers. The
Court upheld this abrogation as an appropriate exercise of the federal
government’s war powers.376 Moreover, in Case v. Bowles,377 the wartime Office of Price Administration (“OPA”) attempted to enjoin a
1943 timber sale by the State of Washington because it exceeded the
federal agency’s price ceiling under the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942.378 Both the Washington State Supreme Court379 and federal
district court380 ruled that the OPA lacked the authority to enjoin a
state’s sale of timber, but the Supreme Court held otherwise. The
Court acknowledged that Washington had exclusive ownership of the
land and that the timber sale complied with state law, but upheld the
statutory restrictions on such sales.381 In a conflict between a state’s
legitimate exercise of its powers382 and the federal government’s war
powers, the latter wins:
374

Id. at 408–09 (emphasis added).

375

Id.

See Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 325 (1953) (upholding SCRA’s preemption of
state law by requiring, for purposes of state taxes, servicemembers’ domicile to remain unchanged by federal military assignments); see also Major Adam W. Kersey, Ticket to Ride: Standardizing Licensure Portability for Military Spouses, 218 MIL. L. REV. 115, 156 (2013).
376

377

327 U.S. 92 (1946).

Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23; Bowles, 327 U.S. at 95–96. Washington argued that
Emergency Price Control Act violated state sovereignty under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments.
Id.
378

379

See Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, 150 P.2d 839, 844 (Wash. 1944).

See Bowles v. Case, 149 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1945) (reversing unpublished district
court order).
380

381

See Bowles, 327 U.S. at 100–02.

382

Washington was selling the timber to fund land-grant education. See id. at 101.
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[O]ur only question is whether the State’s power to make the
sales must be in subordination to the power of Congress to
fix maximum prices in order to carry on war. . . . [A]n absence of federal power to fix maximum prices for state sales
or to control rents charged by a State might result in depriving Congress of ability effectively to prevent the evil of inflation at which the Act was aimed. The result would be that
the constitutional grant of the power to make war would be
inadequate to accomplish its full purpose. And this result
would impair a prime purpose of the Federal Government’s
establishment.383
In Bowles, therefore, the Court reaffirmed the original understanding of the Constitution that even core state functions must take a
backseat to the federal war powers.384
The Court has consistently held that the federal government
alone has the power to make war and engage in other foreign relations, and the Constitution prohibits states from interfering with these
actions or even engaging in similar acts without the federal government’s consent.385 One particularly apt, and more recent, example is
Perpich v. Department of Defense,386 which directly addressed the federal government’s constitutional authority over state militias. In a
unanimous decision, the Court held that the President, acting pursuant to authority provided by Congress, can order state National Guard
members into active federal military duty during peacetime, despite a
governor’s objection.387
Because Perpich directly implicates the federal government’s war
powers authority over states, it is worth considering the case in detail.
In 1918, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute requiring
all National Guard members to take a dual oath to both their state
and the nation, and to permit the President to draft them into federal
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
See Bowles, 149 F.2d at 779. In National League of Cities v. Usery, which struck down
the FLSA’s application to traditional state activities as violating the Tenth Amendment, the
Court distinguished Bowles, emphasizing that “[n]othing we say in [Usery] addresses the scope
of Congress’[s] authority under its war power.” 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.18 (1976), overruled on diff.
grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
385 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 325 (1821); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S.
1, 16–17 (1900); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); see also Goldsmith, supra note 261,
at 1645 (arguing that Constitution “ensured state compliance with the political branches’ foreign
relations enactments” and left “determination of when the national foreign relations interest
would be best served by the exclusion of state power largely to the discretion of the federal
political branches”).
386 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
387 Id. at 353–55.
383
384
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military service.388 Beginning in 1933, state National Guard members
have been required to also enlist in the federal National Guard;389
they remain state National Guard members until they are called into
federal duty, during which service they would not be considered part
of the state armed forces.390 In 1952, Congress limited this federal
power by requiring a governor’s consent before National Guard members could be called to active federal military duty.391 For many years,
this system worked well, with governors routinely providing consent
upon the President’s request.392 But in 1985, the Governors of California and Maine refused to consent to training missions in Honduras for
their National Guard members, which prompted Congress in the next
year to eliminate the consent requirement.393 In Perpich, Minnesota’s
governor challenged this change as a violation of the Constitution’s
Militia Clauses, which the Governor claimed allowed the federal government to call up state National Guard members only for domestic
emergencies, not foreign service or nonemergency situations.394
The Court rejected the Governor’s claim, holding that the Militia
Clauses did not limit the federal government’s ability to take over
state National Guards only when an exigency or extraordinary need
existed.395 Acknowledging the tension faced by the Framers between
concerns over a federal standing army and the inadequacies of the
state militias,396 the Court emphasized that the Militia Clauses included a compromise that gave states the authority to maintain militias, but gave Congress the power both to create a standing army and
to organize and call up state militias.397 Thus, the actions of state militia “are performed pursuant to ‘the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .’”398
388 National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, 39 Stat. 166; Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3,
6 (1918); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 372–73 (1918).
389 See National Defense Act Amendments of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-64, § 18, 48 Stat. 153,
160–61 (1933).
390 After being relieved from active federal duty, servicemembers would return to the state
National Guard. Id.
391 10 U.S.C. § 672(b), (d) (1952).
392 Perpich, 496 U.S. at 346.
393 See id. at 336–37, 346 (discussing “Montgomery Amendment”).
394 See id. at 347. The Governor did not challenge the dual-enlistment system. Id.
395 See id. 351–52.
396 Id. at 340 n.6 (noting Hamilton’s explanation of superiority of a “regular and disciplined
army” over militias which, though valorous, would “have lost us our independence” if they alone
had fought the British, and were insufficient to defend the country (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton))).
397 See id. at 340.
398 Id. at 348 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16).
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The federal government’s authority to call up state militia members over a governor’s objection was, the Court held, “presupposed”
by its 1918 Selective Draft Law Cases.399 There, the Court upheld the
federal draft on the grounds that “the Militia Clauses do not constrain
the powers of Congress ‘to provide for the common Defence’” and to
exercise other war powers; “far from being a limitation on those powers, the Militia Clauses are—as the constitutional text plainly indicates—additional grants of power to Congress.”400 Minnesota’s
Governor argued that this interpretation had “the practical effect of
nullifying an important state power that is expressly reserved in the
Constitution,” but the Court disagreed, emphasizing that the Militia
Clauses recognized “the supremacy of federal power in the area of
military affairs” and that Congress had done nothing to deprive states
of their “constitutional entitlement” to have their own militias.401
Perpich provides a strong confirmation of the states’ understanding of the constitutional war powers by concluding that states are authorized to establish their own militias, but only under the control of
the federal government.402 The allowance of state militias is a limited
exception to the otherwise “exclusive control of the National Government” over matters of foreign policy and military affairs.403 In particular, although the Constitution gave “rise to a presumption that federal
control over the Armed Forces was exclusive,”404 the Militia Clauses
permitted organized state militias while also “subjecting state militia
to express federal limitations.”405 As Hamilton emphasized in The
Federalist No. 74, those limitations included the President’s authority
over the militias once called into federal service, which is an “essential
part” of executive authority because “[o]f all the cares or concerns of
government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”406
The inability of states to interfere with federal war powers is also
supported by a class of cases involving the broader foreign relations
245 U.S. 366 (1918); see Perpich, 496 U.S. at 349.
Perpich, 496 U.S. at 349–50 (quoting Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 375, 377,
381–84) (noting power to call forth militia “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,” which supplemented federal government’s “broad[] power to raise
armies,” to provide for nation’s defense, and numerous other powers over militias).
401 Id. at 351–52 (stressing also that federal government provided “virtually all of the funding, the materiel [sic], and the leadership for the State Guard units”).
402 See supra Section II.A.4.
403 Perpich, 496 U.S. at 353–54.
404 Id. at 353 (citing Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871)).
405 Id. at 354.
406 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
399
400
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powers. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the foreign relations powers, of which the war powers are part, to be exclusively
federal.407 For instance, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,408 the Court held that the states never possessed the power to
engage in foreign relations, including acts of war.409 In Curtiss-Wright,
several defendants challenged their conviction for violating a presidential proclamation and congressional joint resolution prohibiting
arms sales to Bolivia by arguing that the joint resolution was an unlawful delegation of congressional powers to the President.410
In rejecting this argument, the Court first assumed that the joint
resolution would be an invalid delegation unless an exception applied.411 The Court held that an exception did apply because the joint
resolution involved foreign affairs,412 which are “fundamental[ly]” different from domestic affairs because of the federal government’s exclusive control over external matters:413
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that
field, the primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve
from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by
the states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in
the federal government, leaving those not included in the
enumeration still in the states. That this doctrine applies only
to powers which the states had, is self evident. And since the
states severally never possessed international powers, such
407 See infra notes 408, 417 and accompanying text. Even in the earlier Confederation period, states’ ability to engage in acts of foreign affairs was limited. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. VI, para. 1 (“No State without the consent of the United States in Congress
assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any king, prince or state . . . .”); see THE FEDERALIST
NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hamilton describing restrictions on states’ foreign affairs
authority).
408 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
409 Id. at 316, 318 (describing foreign relations “powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, [and] to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties”
and noting that “since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers
could not have been carved from the mass of state powers”).
410 See id. at 311, 314–15 (delegating determination whether to make arms sales illegal).
411 Id. at 315.
412 Id. at 329.
413 Id. at 315, 319. The Court also approved of a series of statutes from 1794–1806 in which
Congress delegated foreign affairs powers to the President, including several involving war powers. Id. at 322–24.
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powers could not have been carved from the mass of state
powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States
from some other source.414
The Court in Curtiss-Wright did not merely hold that federal foreign relations power was superior to the states’ authority—it held that
individual states utterly lacked such power either prior to the Constitution or after its ratification.415 Given states’ role in operating militias, one should not take this holding too far when it comes to the war
powers. Yet the limited and subservient state militia authority does
not detract from the broader conclusion that when it comes to the
national defense and other external concerns, states play no meaningful role under the Constitution.416 Instead, when war and other external powers are at play, the plan of the Convention was to give the
federal government authority unfettered by state interference, including claims of state sovereign immunity.417 The Court has confirmed
this federal foreign relations exclusivity in numerous other cases, including ones upholding federal preemption of state action.418 Even as
414 Id. at 315–16 (citation omitted) (holding further that “[d]uring the colonial period, those
powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the control of the Crown. By the
Declaration of Independence, ‘the Representatives of the United States of America’ declared
the United (not the several) Colonies to be free and independent states, and as such to have ‘full
Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce and to do all other
Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do’ ”).
415 Id. at 316 (noting that the colonies collectively, through the Continental Congress, exercised war powers); see also 9 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA
(2), supra note 281, at 849 (“Having made the United States the sovereign arbiters of war and
peace, given them the right” to engage in war and foreign powers, “there seemed to be little left
of external policy to the individual states”).
416 See supra note 414; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1937) (“[The] complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be
subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states . . . [a]s to such
purposes the State . . . does not exist.” (citation omitted)); Goldsmith, supra note 261, at 1670
(“[T]he functional case for a self-executing prohibition on subnational foreign relations activity
is strongest under [the] traditional concept[]” of foreign relations power, including military
issues).
417 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317 (“The Framers’ Convention was called and exerted
its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several their people in
respect of foreign affairs were one.”).
418 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424–25 (2003) (finding federal executive
order preempted state law requiring disclosure about Holocaust-era insurance policies); Crosby
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000) (striking down state law restricting
trade with Burma due to interference with objectives of federal law); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (invalidating state law limiting claims by nonresident because it “is an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President
and the Congress”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (striking down state court
decisions that conflicted with decree between federal government and foreign country because
“[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
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recently as 2019, the Court in Hyatt stressed the significant difference
between the federal government’s expansive war powers and the
states’ subordinated role: “Article I divests the States of the traditional diplomatic and military tools that foreign sovereigns possess. . . . [T]he Constitution deprives them of the independent
power . . . to wage war.”419 Hyatt and myriad other cases demonstrate
that under the practice and precedent of the Constitution, states lack
sovereign immunity in the face of federal war powers actions, including those that provide individuals the ability to enforce their federal
rights against the states.420
III. OBJECTIONS

TO

WAR POWERS ABROGATION

Despite the overwhelming historical evidence, several post-Alden
state courts—all addressing USERRA claims against state employers—have consistently ruled against war powers abrogation. Although
these courts have provided several rationales, none provide a credible
basis for rejecting war powers abrogation.421
Most arguments against war powers abrogation rely on the Article I dictum and Alden, while distinguishing Katz. As described below,
these cases tend to conflate two key aspects of Katz: its holding that at
least one Article I power—bankruptcy—is not burdened by state immunity claims, and the unique aspects of federal bankruptcy power.
The problem is that no matter how unique bankruptcy may or may
exclusively”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64–65, 68 (1941) (striking down state alien registration act because states cannot alter treaties); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)
(rejecting state’s Tenth Amendment claim because treaties “may override” states’ typical powers); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 605 (1889) (holding federal government is “invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and
intercourse with other nations; all which are forbidden to the state governments”). See generally
G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing supreme federal foreign relations power and the virtual elimination
of a state role).
419 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1497 (2019). The Court stated that
the colonies held themselves out as full sovereigns under the Declaration of Independence, but
the plan of the Convention stripped states of these powers and gave them to the federal government. Id. at 1493, 1497. Although this view conflicts with Curtiss-Wright’s holding that the colonies only held war powers collectively, see supra note 415, both cases confirm the Constitution’s
near-exclusive grant of war powers to the federal government. See 299 U.S. at 316.
420 Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1963) (emphasizing “powers
of Congress to require military service for the common defense are broad and far-reaching, for
while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact”
(footnote omitted)); supra note 266.
421 One case does not directly discuss abrogation at all, seemingly holding that USERRA
permits claims against state employers only if the state expressly agreed to such suits. See Smith
v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 387 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
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not be, Katz without a doubt stands for the proposition that the “no
Article I” dictum no longer applies.422 The current rule may be “almost-no Article I” abrogation, but at least with regard to bankruptcy,
there is an exception. Thus, the question is whether war powers represent another example of valid Article I abrogation. State courts
thus far have not engaged in the required historical analysis to answer
this question, relying instead on specious reasoning to ignore the
strong historical case for war powers abrogation.
A. Article I Dictum
Every court rejecting USERRA abrogation has relied heavily on
the Seminole Tribe-era, Article I dictum.423 Although there was a
short period of time during which the law seemed to be that no Article
I powers could abrogate state sovereignty, Alden’s reasoning ended
that era and confirmed that history, rather than where congressional
power is located in the Constitution, is the key to determining
whether abrogation is valid.424 Thus, state court decisions relying on
this dictum without also examining the history of the Constitution are
unmistakably wrong.425 Even if Alden was not clear on this point, Katz
left no doubt that some Article I power is sufficient to permit individuals to sue nonconsenting states.426
More troubling are courts that inexplicably do nothing but repeat
the Article I dictum without mentioning Katz at all.427 Katz reaffirmed
Alden’s requirement that a historical analysis determine whether
422 See Ramirez v. N.M. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t, 2016-NMSC-016, 372 P.3d 497, 503
(N.M. 2016) (stating that “Katz opened the door to arguments that constitutional history and
structure show that Congress, by acting pursuant to other Article I powers, may subject the
states to private suits absent their consent”).
423 See, e.g., Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 577 F. Supp. 2d 953, 960 (N.D. Ohio
2008). But see Breaker v. Bemidji State Univ., 899 N.W.2d 515, 522 n.12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)
(“Since Alden, the Supreme Court and the lower courts . . . have unambiguously stated that
Congress’s only recognized source of abrogation power is the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
424 See supra Section I.C.
425 See Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 361 (Ala.
2001) (relying on Alden to differentiate Article I and Fourteenth Amendment abrogation).
426 See supra Section I.D.
427 See Janowski v. Div. of State Police, 981 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Del. 2009); Anstadt v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 2004-RCCV-1012, 2009 WL 8702987, at *7 (Ga. State Ct.
Mar. 16, 2009), affirmed, 693 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). One state court rejected war powers abrogation without mentioning Katz, but did cite to another decision that rejected an application of Katz for procedural reasons. See Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 387 S.W.3d 570, 576
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Anstadt 693 S.E.2d at 871) (holding that plaintiff raised Katz first
time on appeal, even though abrogation issue was litigated at trial). The author of this Article
coauthored the petitioner’s appellate brief in Anstadt.

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN302.txt

658

unknown

Seq: 66

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12-MAY-21

13:47

[Vol. 89:593

states are immune from individual suits brought under federal law.
Thus, rejecting war powers abrogation simply based on Article I dictum, without any historical examination of the war powers, is flatly
insufficient.
B. Distinguishing Katz
Most courts addressing war powers abrogation for the first time
acknowledge Katz and, to varying degrees, grapple with its holding
that the Article I Bankruptcy Clause permits abrogation. These courts
have distinguished Katz on various grounds, especially two unusual
aspects of bankruptcy: the typically (but not exclusively) in rem nature
of bankruptcy jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Clause’s explicit emphasis on uniformity.428 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in a case involving copyright abrogation, recently cited these aspects of Katz,
stating in dicta that it is a “good-for-one-clause-only holding.”429
While these characteristics do set bankruptcy apart from most
other Article I war powers, neither is sufficient to reject war powers
abrogation. Indeed, courts distinguishing Katz use these two factors as
a one-way ratchet—they examine ways in which the bankruptcy
power supports abrogation more than the war powers but fail to explore ways in which the war powers abrogation claim is stronger.
Despite the Supreme Court’s clarity on the need to engage in a
historical analysis, no state court has done so in more than a cursory
way, and most not at all.430 But Katz makes clear that Article I might
allow for abrogation of state sovereign immunity if supported by the
plan of the Convention. Indeed, the Court took pains to explain that
the Bankruptcy Clause’s placement in Article I does not mean it
should be lumped in with the Article I commerce powers when it
comes to state sovereign immunity.431 Any attempt to distinguish Katz
See infra Section III.B.
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020).
430 See, e.g., Clark v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 793 S.E.2d 1, 7 n.7 (Va. 2016) (“Given the
breadth of the holding in Alden and the narrowness of the exception recognized in Katz, we
need not address in any detail Clark’s historical argument about the breadth of the congressional
war powers.”).
431 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 369 n.9 (2006) (“Of course, the Bankruptcy
Clause, located as it is in Article I, is ‘intimately connected’ . . . with the Commerce Clause. That
does not mean, however, that the state sovereign immunity implications of the Bankruptcy
Clause necessarily mirror those of the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Clause’s
unique history, combined with the singular nature of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction . . . have
persuaded us that the ratification of the Bankruptcy Clause does represent a surrender by the
States of their sovereign immunity in certain federal proceedings.” (citations omitted) (quoting
Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982))).
428
429
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therefore must do so by asking whether differences between the bankruptcy and war powers are sufficient as a historical matter to justify
state interference with the latter but not the former. This is a difficult
task, as the historical record strongly suggests that state sovereignty is
nonexistent in the war powers arena. In other words, if Katz recognized the existence of “bankruptcy exceptionalism,”432 there is a very
strong argument as well for “war powers exceptionalism.” Courts’ unwillingness to grapple with this history is compounded by the fact that
they place far more reliance on the distinguishing features of bankruptcy than is deserved.
1. The (Mostly) In Rem Nature of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The most common ground that courts use to distinguish Katz is
the typically in rem nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction.433 This characteristic has some salience, but only up to a point. It is true that bankruptcy jurisdiction is usually in rem,434 which the Court has stressed
does not implicate state sovereignty to the same degree as in personam jurisdiction.435 The entire purpose of Katz, however, was to address whether bankruptcy abrogation was constitutional when applied
to in personam cases.436 In Katz, the Court held that it was.437
In the earlier Hood case, the Court granted certiorari to address
the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the Article I bankruptcy power generally permitted abrogation of state immunity.438 But instead, the Court
held only that the claim at issue did not threaten state sovereignty
because it did not seek money or any affirmative action from the state
creditor.439 Thus, the Hood Court addressed only in rem bankruptcy
proceedings that do not seriously implicate state sovereignty, waiting
432

Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002.

See Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 577 F. Supp. 2d 953, 962 n.1 (N.D. Ohio
2008); Clark, 793 S.E.2d at 5–7; Breaker v. Bemidji State Univ., 899 N.W.2d 515, 524 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2017); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Torres, 583 S.W.3d 221, 228–29 (Tex. App. 2018); Anstadt v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 693 S.E.2d 868, 871 n.14 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010);
Ramirez v. New Mexico ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t, 2014-NMCA-057, 326 P.3d 474, 480
(N.M. Ct. App. 2014).
433

434

See Katz, 546 U.S. at 362 (stating “[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem”).

435

Id.; see Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002.

436

See supra notes 150–56.

437

See Katz, 546 U.S. at 371.

438 See Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 756, 761–62 (6th Cir. 2003) (using
historical analysis to uphold bankruptcy abrogation), aff’d, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
439 Hood, 541 U.S. at 446–47 (comparing discharge of debt, in which bankruptcy courts
have exclusive jurisdiction of debtor’s property, to an in rem admiralty action).
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until later to address bankruptcy proceedings that did so.440 The answer to this question came in Katz.
In Katz, the Court reaffirmed that the exercise of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction “does not, in the usual case, interfere with state sovereignty even when States’ interests are affected.”441 The reference to
“the usual case” necessarily means that although bankruptcy cases do
not typically implicate state sovereign immunity, sometimes they
do.442 The Court made this conclusion explicit when explaining why
constitutional history supported Congress’s ability to subject nonconsenting states to bankruptcy suits, a history showing that “[t]he Framers would have understood that laws ‘on the subject of Bankruptcies’
included laws providing, in certain limited respects, for more than simple adjudications of rights in the res.”443 In addition, the Court noted
that among the Bankruptcy Clause’s main purposes was to give federal courts the power to issue habeas writs against states, which are in
personam in nature.444 Indeed, Katz itself arguably invoked the bankruptcy court’s in personam processes,445 which “operate[] free and
clear of the State’s claim of sovereign immunity.”446 This means that,
contrary to the position of some state courts,447 Katz leaves the door
440 See id. at 452–53; id. at 455–64 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that bankruptcy abrogation was invalid, even for in rem cases).
441 Katz, 546 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added); see also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002
(2020) (“In part, Katz rested on the ‘singular nature’ of bankruptcy jurisdiction. . . . [that was]
‘principally in rem . . . .’ ” (citation omitted)).
442

Katz, 546 U.S. at 370.

Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 372 (“A court order mandating turnover of the
property, although ancillary to and in furtherance of the court’s in rem jurisdiction, might itself
involve in personam process.”).
443

444

Id. at 371.

See id. at 372 n.10. Moreover, the Katz dissent explicitly disclaimed any relevance of in
rem jurisdiction:
445

The fact that certain aspects of the bankruptcy power may be characterized as in
rem, however, does not determine whether or not the States enjoy sovereign immunity against such in rem suits. And it certainly does not answer the question
presented in this case: whether the Bankruptcy Clause subjects the States to transfer recovery proceedings—proceedings the majority describes as ‘ancillary to and
in furtherance of the court’s in rem jurisdiction,’ though not necessarily themselves
in rem . . . .
Id. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
446

Id. at 373 (majority opinion).

See, e.g., Clark v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 793 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Va. 2016) (“The Katz qualification, applicable only to claims arising within a federal bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction
over a bankruptcy estate, does not apply to Clark’s state-court claim for in personam
damages.”).
447
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open for other in personam claims against nonconsenting states filed
pursuant to Article I powers.448
To be sure, the generally in rem nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction
was an important part of the historical evidence surrounding bankruptcy abrogation,449 a characteristic that war powers legislation does
not share. That does not mean that other aspects of the federal war
powers cannot support the abrogation of state sovereignty. In other
words, merely stating “in rem” is not enough to distinguish Katz.
Courts must consider the historical evidence to determine whether the
war powers constitute an additional source of Article I abrogation.
2. The Bankruptcy Clause’s “Uniform Laws” Policy
In addition to the in rem nature of most bankruptcy actions, the
Bankruptcy Clause differs from other Article I provisions in its specific grant of authority to Congress “[t]o establish . . . uniform
[l]aws . . . throughout the United States . . . .”450 Some courts have
pointed to this stress on uniformity to distinguish bankruptcy and war
powers abrogation.451
In Katz, the Court noted the Bankruptcy Clause’s “uniform laws”
language, stating that its purpose was to eliminate the disparate treatment of debtors across states, in particular to allow federal courts to
ensure that the discharge of debt or the release of a debtor from
prison in one state would be respected in another.452 However, the
Court also expressly stated that its holding “does not rest on the peculiar text of the Bankruptcy Clause as compared to other Clauses of
Article I . . . .”453 That said, it is clearly helpful that the Bankruptcy
Clause states the need for uniformity across the country.454 But does
the lack of a reference to “uniform laws” equally undermine war powers abrogation?
See Katz, 546 U.S. at 378.
See id.
450 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
451 See Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 577 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963 (N.D. Ohio 2008);
Clark, 793 S.E.2d at 7; Ramirez v. New Mexico ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t, 2014NMCA-057, 326 P.3d 474, 480 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014); Anstadt v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys.
of Ga., 693 S.E.2d 868, 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
452 See Katz, 546 U.S. at 368–69; see also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (2020).
(noting that the Bankruptcy Clause “emerged from a felt need to curb the States’ authority” and
“in that project, the Framers intended federal courts to play a leading role”).
453 Katz, 546 U.S. at 376 n.13, 377 (holding that “text aside, the Framers, in adopting the
Bankruptcy Clause, plainly intended to give Congress the power to redress the rampant injustice
resulting from States’ refusal to respect one another’s discharge orders”).
454 Id. at 376 n.13.
448
449
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Although the constitutional war powers do not state the magic
words “uniform laws,” their text and history endorse an equally—if
not more powerful—need for exclusive and uniform federal control of
the nation’s defenses. Recall that many war powers provisions give the
federal government sole authority over the military, while simultaneously prohibiting state action except for limited authority over militias, pursuant to congressional control.455 The plan of the Convention,
ratification debates, and subsequent cases and statutes reaffirm the
understanding of James Madison, who asserted that “Congress ought
to have the power to establish a uniform discipline throughout the
states . . . .”456 Accordingly, just as the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity
goal supports federal subordination of state sovereign immunity, so
does the War Powers Clauses’.
3. The Application of Katz in State Court
Some state court decisions distinguish Katz by noting that it involved federal court jurisdiction and, therefore, the result in Alden
should apply to war powers cases in state court.457 Although it is true
that Katz involved federal jurisdiction, these courts get the significance of that fact, if there is any, entirely backwards. If there is any
jurisdictional difference with regard to state sovereign immunity, it is
that such immunity has a stronger claim when federal jurisdiction is
involved, especially when the suit involves claims by one of the state’s
own citizens.
In Alden, the Court admitted that it was extending the breadth of
state sovereign immunity beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment and long-standing precedent by applying the doctrine to state
court.458 Previously, the assumption was that the Eleventh Amendment had no impact in state courts at all.459 Thus, if there is any jurisdictional difference, state immunity claims should be weaker in state
court.
See supra notes 242–54 and accompanying text.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 90; see also supra notes 259, 280, 352 and accompanying
text; THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“This
desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the
direction of the national authority.”).
457 Clark v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 793 S.E.2d 1, 6–7 (Va. 2016); Breaker v. Bemidji State
Univ., 899 N.W.2d 515, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
458 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
459 See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness,
99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996).
455

R

456
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C. The Necessary and Proper Clause
A limited number of courts rejecting war powers abrogation have
argued that, in enacting laws like USERRA, Congress attempted to
abrogate solely pursuant to Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause,
rather than the War Powers Clauses.460 This argument, to put it
bluntly, is nonsensical.
First, the assertion that “the regulation of non-military employment discrimination against members of the armed forces is not
among” the enumerated war powers461 is contradicted by the history
of the war powers, judicial precedent, and Congress. As described
above, the plan of the Convention was to provide the federal government broad and near-exclusive war powers to ensure the nation’s defense.462 Courts have consistently recognized that Congress expressly
used these war powers to enact USERRA,463 the purpose of which is
to ensure an adequate number of trained military personnel for the
nation’s security.
Second, this line of reasoning conflicts with a vast number of
cases, such as Katz, that involved legislation enacted pursuant to various congressional powers—cases that focused on the Article I power
at issue, not the Necessary and Proper Clause.464 Moreover, the argument makes no sense logically. The Necessary and Proper Clause only
gives Congress the authority to make laws “carrying into Execution”
Article I powers.465 It is not a standalone power.466
Finally, the Court has stated that empowering provisions like the
Necessary and Proper Clause can provide Congress with a valid basis
for abrogation. In Fitzpatrick, for instance, the Court upheld Fourteenth Amendment abrogation enacted pursuant to Section 5’s “by
460 Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 577 F. Supp. 2d 953, 962 (N.D. Ohio 2008);
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Torres, 583 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. 2018).
461 Torres, 583 S.W.3d at 228 n.4.
462 See supra Section II.A.
463 See supra note 24.
464 See supra note 328; infra note 466.
465 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping
Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1351 (2015) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause can “authorize extreme measures in extreme times”).
466 See Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 325 (1953) (upholding abrogation under
SCRA and describing Necessary and Proper Clause as “supplementary power” to war powers).
The court in Torres may have been led astray by a statement in Alden that the Necessary and
Proper Clause does not provide Congress separate authority to abrogate state sovereignty.
Torres, 583 S.W.3d at 228 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999)). However, the Court
emphasized that the central issue is whether the underlying constitutional power, not the Necessary and Proper Clause, permitted abrogation. Alden, 527 U.S. at 732–33.

R
R
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appropriate legislation” provision.467 In short, the Necessary and
Proper Clause merely gives Congress the power to enact legislation
pursuant to its war powers, and those powers provide the authority to
subject nonconsenting states to suit.
D. States Will Comply with Federal Law Despite Sovereign
Immunity
At times, courts have sided with state sovereign claims by downplaying the harm that immunity imposes on claimants. For instance, in
Alden the Court stated that state immunity “does not confer upon the
State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law” and that it was “unwilling to assume the States will refuse to
honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States.”468 This faith in state compliance, however, is hard to square
with reality.
The most obvious problem with this claim is that it was made in a
case in which a state was alleged to have refused to follow federal law.
And not just any law, but one of the most established and broadly
known federal employment requirements: providing overtime compensation.469 This argument also mistakenly presupposes that ill intent
is required. Even a state employer acting in good faith can violate
USERRA or other laws through carelessness, misunderstandings,
rogue officials, or other means. Simply assuming away these instances
does not make them disappear. Indeed, the Court was well aware that
many states had been engaging in a prolonged effort to claim immunity against federal statutes, and it is hard to believe that they were
not doing so, at least in part, to avoid compliance with those laws.470
These concerns are particularly relevant when it comes to
USERRA. We can gauge states’ intent to comply with that law
through a proxy: states’ willingness to waive their sovereign immunity
against USERRA claims or against their own USERRA-like laws. In
2004, I comprehensively analyzed which states permitted monetary
claims against state employers for USERRA-type claims, finding that
467 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“We think that Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
468 Alden, 527 U.S. at 754–55.
469 See Brown v. L & P Indus., LLC, No. 5:04CV0379JLH, 2005 WL 3503637, at *12 (E.D.
Ark. Dec. 21, 2005).
470 See Brief of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Alden, 527 U.S.
706 (No. 98-436), 1999 WL 73806 (brief of 36 states in support of Maine’s immunity claim).
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only thirteen arguably waived their immunity for reemployment or
leave claims and only four did so for discrimination claims.471 In the
intervening years, despite litigation involving state immunity in
USERRA cases, it does not appear that any additional states have
waived their immunity.472 That just a small minority of the states are
willing to subject themselves fully to USERRA undermines claims
that sovereign immunity will not be used as a bar to the enforcement
of this important statute.
CONCLUSION
The ability of states to cite sovereign immunity to avoid individual suits under federal war powers legislation comes down to history.
Did the Framers and ratifying states believe that, under the Constitution, states were sovereign in the war powers arena? Was the plan of
the Convention to give states the authority to thwart federal efforts to
strengthen the nation’s defenses—based on states’ concern with having forced to pay monetary damages to individuals? The importance
of unfettered federal war powers to this nation’s founding points to
one answer: no.
The Supreme Court’s current state sovereign immunity jurisprudence requires an analysis of the text, history, practice, and precedent
of the Constitution to determine whether immunity exists in a given
area. Although the Court has resisted abrogation under many Article
I powers, its historical analysis keeps the door open to others, such as
its validation of bankruptcy abrogation. The unanswered question is
whether war powers is another instance in which states are unable to
use sovereign immunity to avoid complying with federal legislation.
As this Article shows, the history of the War Powers Clauses
reveals that one of the central goals of the plan of the Convention was
for the nation’s war powers to lie with a centralized federal government. So important was this aim, that what little military authority
states possessed was completely subordinated to the federal war powers. The near-exclusive centralization of power and subordination of
states are exactly the sort of characteristics that the Court—relying
upon Founders like Alexander Hamilton—has pointed to in finding
exceptions to states’ ability to claim sovereign immunity. Permitting
Hirsch, supra note 5, at 1039–41.
Moreover, it does not appear that the federal government has much interest or ability in
prosecuting cases against state employers on behalf of employees. See id. at 1034–36 (describing
federal government’s ability to sue states under USERRA without triggering sovereign
immunity).
471
472
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abrogation under the war powers acknowledges the practical effects of
state sovereignty as well. It is difficult to imagine that the ratifying
states thought the Constitution gave them the ability to use claims of
sovereignty to obstruct federal war powers legislation by, for instance,
refusing to give federally mandated leave to servicemembers who are
engaged in military training or active duty.
The history of our Constitution reveals that, when it comes to war
powers, states simply are not considered sovereigns. Attempts to argue otherwise conflict not only with history, but also the reality that
state immunity claims could threaten the safety of the nation. Unless
we are willing to abide the possibility that the Constitution is a “suicide pact,”473 war powers abrogation should be lawful.

473

See supra note 420.

R

